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Programme 
The World Trade Institute Workshop on 
 
WTO Appellate Review: Reform Proposals and Alternatives 
 
Friday, 24 May 2019 
at the World Trade Organization, Geneva 
Room D 
 
   
9:00 – 9:15 Welcome and introduction by Peter Van den Bossche, World Trade Institute, 
University of Bern 
 
9:15 – 10:45  Scope of and timeframe for appellate review 
  *Please see the annex to this programme for the questions posed to this panel 
  
                  Chair:  Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bocconi University, Milano 
 
Panellists:  Maria Alcover, Advisory Center on WTO Law, Geneva  
Gitanjali Brandon, Permanent Mission of India to the WTO, 
Geneva 
James Flett, Legal Service, European Commission, Brussels 
Guilherme L. Leivas Leite, Mission of Brazil to the WTO, Geneva 
Jasper Wauters, White & Case LLP, Geneva 
  
10:45 – 11:15 Coffee break 
 
11:15 – 12:45 Judicial activism and precedent 
  *Please see the annex to this programme for the questions posed to this panel 
  
Chair:  Gabrielle Marceau, Associate Professor, UNIGE; Legal Affairs 
Division, WTO, Geneva 
 
Panellists:  Katherine Connolly, Sidley Austin LLP, Geneva 
Philippe De Baere, Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels  
Michael Hahn, World Trade Institute, University of Bern 
Alana Lanza, Permanent Mission of Honduras to the WTO, Geneva 
Robert McDougall, Cadence Global Ltd; Centre for International 
Governance Innovation 
Niall Meagher, Advisory Center on WTO Law, Geneva 
 
12:45 – 14:30 Lunch break 
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14:30 – 17:00 Alternatives for appellate review and WTO dispute settlement (tea break at 
15:30) 
  *Please see the annex to this programme for the questions posed to this panel 
  
Chair:  Joost Pauwelyn, Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, Geneva 
 
Panellists:  Natalia Bayurova, World Trade Institute, University of Bern 
Rambod Behboodi, King & Spalding, Geneva 
Nicolas Lockhart, Sidley Austin LLP, Geneva 
Martin Lukas, DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels 
Ricardo Ramirez, Mexican National University, Mexico City 
Leticia Ramirez Aguilar, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the 
WTO, Geneva 
Jan Yves Rémy, Shridath Ramphal Centre for International Trade 
Law, Policy & Services, Barbados 
Isabelle Van Damme, Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels 
Alan Yanovich, Akin Gump, Geneva 
 
17:00 Conclusions and closing by Thomas Cottier, World Trade Institute, University of 
Bern 
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Annex  
 
 
Questions posed to the panel on “Scope of and timeframe for appellate review” 
 
 Should the objectivity of factual findings of a panel be subject to appellate review? 
 Should panel findings on the meaning of municipal law be subject to appellate review? How 
to separate the meaning of municipal law from assessing the consistency of municipal law 
with WTO law? 
 Should appellate review be limited to only those issues that need to be addressed to resolve 
the dispute? What is necessary to resolve a dispute? Can a dispute ever be considered 
‘resolved’ when the correct interpretation of the relevant legal provision(s) is still disputed 
between the parties? 
 Should the Appellate Body refrain from modifying legal interpretations developed by panels 
when it agrees with the panel’s conclusion on the WTO consistency of the measure at issue? 
 Can the exercise of judicial economy by the Appellate Body be mandatory, and, if so, in 
which circumstances? 
 Is completing the legal analysis within the scope of appellate review under Article 17.6 of the 
DSU?  
 Is an Appellate Body report circulated after the 90-day period no longer a report to be 
adopted by reverse consensus? 
 Can a mandatory treaty rule, such as the 90-day rule of Article 17.5 of the DSU, be set aside by 
the parties to a dispute (whether by way of prior agreement or by ex-post deeming letters) or 
by a DSB decision? 
 Can there be exceptional or mitigating circumstances under which the Appellate Body would 
be entitled to exceed the 90-day timeframe, even without the consent of both parties (e.g. 
the circumstances in United States – Lead and Bismuth (DS138))? Who would decide on the 
exceptional or mitigating nature of the circumstances? 
 If the Appellate Body can exceed the 90-day timeframe only with the consent of the parties, 
what prevents an appellee from undermining or depriving an appellant of the right to appeal 
in large and complex disputes? 
 If the parties do not consent to a 90-day-plus timeframe for appellate review, or do not agree 
to reduce the number of issues appealed, and the Appellate Body is called upon to limit the 
scope of the appeal in order to stay within the 90-day timeframe, how and on the basis of 
which objective criteria should the Appellate Body decide to limit the scope of the appeal? 
 Do the parties to a specific dispute have sufficient information on the workload of the 
Appellate Body in other disputes to assess the time needed for the Appellate Body to complete 
appellate review in their dispute? 
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 Would parties requesting a DSB decision extending the 60-day period for filing appeals 
under Article 16.4 contribute to resolving the ‘90-day-problem’?  
 Would a different calculation of the 90-day timeframe (e.g. by counting working days only) 
or an extension of the timeframe to 120 or 150 days resolve the ’90-day problem’?  
 Would the imposition of mandatory page-limits on written submissions or limits on the 
length of oral hearings speed up appellate review in complex disputes? 
 Should the random composition of Appellate Body divisions be abandoned, and appeals be 
assigned to Appellate Body Members with the least workload in order to speed up appellate 
review? 
 Should the Appellate Body no longer exchange views among all its Members in each appeal 
in order to speed up appellate review? 
 
Questions posed to the panel on “Judicial activism and precedent” 
 
 Can the clarification of a legal provision in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law amount to judicial activism? 
 Are there objective criteria to determine whether the clarification of a legal provision 
amounts to judicial activism? 
 How much importance can and should be given to negotiating history in the interpretation 
of WTO legal provisions? Is there a common understanding of what constitutes 
GATT/WTO negotiating history? 
 Does the case law of the Appellate Body stand for the proposition that there is binding 
precedent in WTO dispute settlement? 
 What are ‘cogent reasons’ that justify deviation from established case law? 
 Can a panel conclude that there are cogent reasons to deviate from established case law, i.e. 
that the established case law is not ‘persuasive’, on the mere basis that it interprets the 
relevant provision differently? 
 What would be the terms of reference for the proposed annual meeting between the DSB and 
the Appellate Body to discuss developments in WTO case law? How to avoid that Members 
would at such meeting not merely repeat their disagreement with the Appellate Body on 
legal issues on which the latter ruled against them?  
 In deciding whether established case law is not ‘persuasive’ should a panel consider that 
WTO dispute settlement aims to bring security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system? 
 If Appellate Body interpretations of WTO provisions were to be reviewed by the DSB, a 
DSB committee or any other body composed of representatives of WTO Members, how 
would decisions on the correctness of the Appellate Body interpretation be taken? By 
consensus? By (qualified) majority vote? 
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 On what basis could the DSB, a DSB committee or any other body composed of 
representatives of WTO Members come to the conclusion that the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of a WTO provision is incorrect and reflects judicial activism? Would it be on 
the basis of a wrong application of the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law or could there also be another basis?  
 If the DSB, a DSB committee or any other body composed of representatives of WTO 
Members finds that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of a WTO provision is incorrect, 
what are the consequences for the panel and Appellate Body reports at issue? 
 If an Appellate Body interpretation of a WTO provision were to be ‘upheld’ by the DSB, a 
DSB committee or any other body, would this interpretation be binding on panels and the 
Appellate Body in all subsequent disputes? 
 
Questions posed to the panel on “Alternatives for appellate review and WTO dispute 
settlement” 
 
 Would a more in-depth and expanded interim review of panel reports replace, at least to 
some extent, appellate review? 
 Apart from the exceptional case, can parties be expected to agree before the initiation of 
panel proceedings not to appeal the panel report? Why would a respondent (who is 
statistically likely to lose the case) be willing to waive its right of appeal? Would in most cases 
a respondent not prefer to have a panel report that would not become legally binding as long 
as there is no Appellate Body to decide on an appeal (which could be forever)? 
 Once appellate review under Article 17 of the DSU is no longer available, why would a 
respondent agree to resort to Article 25 of the DSU to allow for appellate review? Would in 
most cases a respondent not prefer the panel report never to become legally binding on it? 
 Pursuant to Article 16.4 of the DSU, a panel report is to be adopted or not by the DSB 
within 60 days of its circulation unless it is appealed pursuant Article 17 of the DSU. Does 
recourse to Article 25 of the DSU set aside Article 16.4? 
 Is Article 25 of the DSU sufficiently flexible for parties to agree to replicate closely the 
essential features of appellate review under Article 17 of the DSU? Which features cannot be 
replicated?  
 How could the Appellate Body's exchange of views be replicated or in what other way can 
predictability and coherence of rulings be ensured? 
 Are parties having recourse to Article 25 of the DSU for appellate review of panel reports 
free to deviate substantially from the features of appellate review under Article 17 of the 
DSU? In case of substantial deviation would Article 25 be (ab)used to ‘circumvent’ the DSU 
(see in this regard Award of Arbitrators in US – Section 110(5), footnote 22)? 
 At what time in the process should parties agree to resort to Article 25 arbitration to allow 
for appellate review of a panel report? 
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 Can compliance with an agreement to have recourse to appeal-arbitration under Article 25 
be ensured/enforced?  
 How should the reference in Article 25.4 to Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU be 
operationalized? 
 Are appeal-arbitrators to be appointed by the parties in each case in which they agreed to have 
recourse to appeal-arbitration under Article 25 DSU? Who decides on the appeal-arbitrators 
if and when the parties cannot agree? In other words, who would be the appointing 
authority? 
 Are appeal-arbitrators not to be to be appointed by the parties but to be selected randomly from 
a roster of potential appeal-arbitrators? 
 Who should be included in the roster of potential appeal-arbitrators? How to ensure that the 
membership of this roster is broadly representative of the WTO membership? Should only 
current and former Appellate Body members be included in the roster of appeal-arbitrators? 
If not, who decides on the inclusion of other persons? 
 Can a randomly composed division of appeal-arbitrators include arbitrators with the same 
nationality? Can it include arbitrators with the nationality of the participants/third 
participants? 
 Arbitration awards do not require DSB adoption to become binding, while the non-appealed 
findings of a panel report do require DSB adoption. When and how should the panel report, 
as upheld, modified or reversed by the arbitration award be adopted? Can appeal-arbitrators 
be expected to agree to include in their award, and thus make binding, all non-appealed 
panel findings?  
 Could/should the staff of the Appellate Body Secretariat service the arbitrators hearing and 
deciding appeals under Article 25 of the DSU? 
 When can diplomatic dispute resolution methods, such as good offices by the Director 
General or others, mediation or conciliation under Article 5 of the DSU, be alternatives for 
adjudication by panels and the Appellate Body? 
 Are the non-binding recommendations or findings of a mediator or conciliator likely to 
contribute more to the resolution of a dispute than an unadopted panel report? 
 Would it be feasible – legally and/or politically – to negotiate among a group of ‘willing’ 
WTO Members a plurilateral ‘DSU’ or a ‘DSU minus N’ which would ensure among these 
Members the continuation of dispute settlement as it currently exists under the DSU? 
 Would recourse to dispute settlement provided for under RTAs be an effective alternative 
for WTO dispute settlement? 
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Note on Transcription and Editing 
This document only contains contributions of the Workshop participants who agreed to 
publication. The World Trade Institute provided these participants with the original transcribed 
versions of their contributions, and the participants were then given the opportunity to make 
appropriate corrections and edits. All texts in this publication have been reviewed by relevant 
participants and reflect their final edits. 
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Welcome and Introduction 
 
Peter Van den Bossche 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, current and former colleagues, friends on all sides of the debate, I 
welcome you to this workshop on WTO Appellate Review organized by the World Trade Institute. 
Today, the sun shines over Geneva and the Lac Leman, but it does not do so on WTO and its 
dispute settlement system. For the WTO and the dispute settlement system, these are dark days 
and it is this sad reality that brings us together today. Since November 2018, no less than 22 
WTO members have either individually or in groups, tabled proposals for the reform of the 
WTO appellate review system and these proposals are currently subject to intense discussions. At 
the same time, there are a lot of discussions about what can and/ or what should be done to 
avoid the collapse of the whole WTO dispute settlement system if after the 10th of December, 
and that is in six months and two weeks from now, there would no longer be a functional 
Appellate Body to hear and decide new appeals. The programme of our workshop refers to the 
latter discussion as the discussion on the alternatives.  
 
The purpose of this workshop is, first, to seek clarification of the proposals for reform of WTO 
appellate review currently under consideration; second, to explore the alternatives for WTO 
appellate review; and, third, to assess the practicability (for lack of a better word) of both the 
proposals for reform and the alternatives. To avoid that the discussions of today remain too 
general and thus, less unhelpful, the programme includes in an annex, a large number, probably 
too large a number, of specific questions on which the discussions in the various panels will 
focus. I am convinced that to many of these questions, we will hear today some very different 
answers.  
 
Before giving the floor to the first panel, the panel on the scope of and the time frame for 
appellate review, I would like to take the opportunity to thank the WTO for making available to 
us today this meeting room, and all the panelists for having agreed to contribute to this 
workshop. I would also like to thank the sponsors, in alphabetical order, Akin Gump, King & 
Spalding, Sidley, Van Bael & Bellis and White & Case, without whose support, there would be no 
cookies with the morning coffee and afternoon tea as well as a few even more important things. I 
would finally like to thank the chairs of our three panels today, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Gabrielle 
Marceau and Joost Pauwelyn, who have already done a great job in organizing their respective 
panels and will have the thankless task to ensure that you, the participants in this workshop, get 
an opportunity to speak, should you wish to do so, and, as a second part of this thankless task, to 
ensure that we stay more or less on schedule.  
 
The proceeding of this workshop are recorded and the WTI hopes to produce, as it is doing for 
the conference we organized in February last, an e-book with the edited contributions of all the 
participants who wish to share their views with a wider audience. With all this said, I thank all of 
you for participating in this workshop in such large numbers and I yield the floor to Giorgio 
Sacerdoti to chair the first session. Thank you.  
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Session 1 
Scope of and timeframe for appellate review 
 
  
                  Chair:  Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bocconi University, Milano 
 
Panellists:  Maria Alcover, Advisory Center on WTO Law, Geneva  
Gitanjali Brandon, Permanent Mission of India to the WTO, 
Geneva 
James Flett, Legal Service, European Commission, Brussels 
Guilherme L. Leivas Leite, Mission of Brazil to the WTO, 
Geneva 
Jasper Wauters, White & Case LLP, Geneva 
 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much. Well, I’m very impressed by the large gathering in this room to day. Even 
in the Appellate Body (AB) case whose hearing took place in this room, EC-Preferences, which I 
chaired, where there were a very large number of WTO members attending the room, it was not 
so crowded as it is today. This shows really that the situation which we are addressing is very 
serious and is viewed as such by everybody involved with WTO dispute settlement and the 
proper functioning of the multilateral system in general.  
 
I will just make an initial comment. Often it is said that there are three values to be pursued in 
any adjudicatory system domestic or international in order to render it effective, respected and 
qualitatively valuable. But that you cannot have together all the three, you can have just two at the 
same time, with choices having to be made. One is the quality of the adjudication (the outcome), 
so in our case the completeness of the analysis and quality of the reasoning and interpretation by 
the AB, and thus the persuasiveness of its reports (this would apply also to the Panels). Then you 
have the promptness of decision-making. Delayed justice is justice denied sometimes it is said, so 
you want to have a speedy, prompt, settlement of the disputes, such as ninety days for rendering 
an Appellate Body’s report. And the third is cost efficiency. I think this is relevant also at the 
WTO, where Members seek no cost increase of the budget, where the AB is made of just seven 
members who are moreover part-time, with a small staff. So, if you want to give priority to the 
quality of the decision making, which is fundamental also beyond the litigants and the WTO 
membership, and you want decisions rendered within a short time frame, then you will have to 
devote more resources, spending more money for a bigger AB, with a larger staff, more 
translators and so on. If instead you value more the cost efficiency (as in any case constrained by 
budgetary limits), and you want to maintain a strict time frame, thus prioritizing cost efficiency 
and timely justice, then you will have to accept summary, incomplete justice: you will have to opt 
for annulments rather than review of all legal issues, accept limitations to the right of appeal and 
the extension of the arguments that parties are allowed to make, summary decisions, renouncing 
to full appeal in law.. And finally, if you don’t want to increase the costs and nor to renounce to 
the quality of the process and of the outcomes, then you can’t have at the same time speedy 
justice. This is probably what happens now: decisions require more time than envisaged in the 
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DSU due to the number and complexity of cases submitted to the panels and the AB. I think that 
keeping these constraints in mind may be a good introduction.  
 
Coming to the organization of this session, Peter has set up for us, or rather for you, an 
impressive list of issues. I have shared with my colleagues on the panels some ideas as how best 
to address them. We agreed to sub divide them in three categories. The first one is ‘judicial 
economy’; the second is the issue concerning the ninety days and third is the organization of the 
proceedings’ workload. So the first group  would include items such as: should there be restraint 
by the Appellate Body in addressing  issues which are not strictly necessary to decide the case, 
with a view to speed up the appellate process; not reviewing findings of panels on domestic or 
municipal law  whatever their characterization as factual or legal issues; and then not completing 
the legal analysis even when this is possible, notwithstanding that the lack of remand powers 
under the DSU may hamper the ‘prompt settlement’ of a dispute . This would be the first block.  
The second would be the ninety days issue. Here, you have the question whether this time limit 
may be exceeded by the AB for serious reasons (such as multiple cases pending at the same time), 
or by consent of the parties. To allow more time for the decision could the days be calculated in 
another way (such as just working days), or could the time required for the translation not be 
considered within the ninety days because it doesn’t depend on the Appellate Body? Could as a 
consequence the time limit be met by the reports being initially circulated (to the parties only?) in 
the original language with the translation to follow afterwards? The third group includes the 
organization of proceedings, workload, dialogue, page limits for submissions, method of 
appointing AB members on each division.  
 
We also want to have time for questions from the floor. Should we have them all at the end of 
the three presentations or after each one? Maybe it would be better at the end because the issues 
overlap in part.  
 
James Flett 
 
Okay, thank you Giorgio. So, I have been privileged enough to be frequently involved in WTO 
dispute settlement over the years. It is my view that there is nothing seriously wrong with the 
dispute settlement system. That may sound smug or complacent. Certainly, there are always 
things that can be improved, of course. But as was said very many times during the last decade in 
the context of DSU review, while one can always look to improve things, one should be very 
careful to do no harm.  
 
I think, unfortunately, circumstances have allowed the agenda to be set based on the assumption 
that there is a major problem that needs to be addressed. I think that assumption is false, and I 
wonder how political scientists will look back on this time. I wonder how people outside this 
room would look at us and what they would think of what we’re actually doing here. I don’t want 
to complicate things but it feels a bit like Brexit, if that makes sense.  
 
So, I want to use my first five minutes to address two points on the basic vocabulary that is 
currently being used, because, as I think is so often the case, it is in the very choice of words that 
one finds the value judgments are buried, and I think those value judgments are demonstrably 
incorrect. And so my first point…my first point is what I have called in discussion with my 
panelists ‘the bridge of reason’. If I could just sit here and say ‘bridge of reason’ a thousand times 
to counteract every time somebody has said ‘gap filling’, I would be a happy man. But I am not 
going to bore you with that. The bridge of reason is required by 12.7 of the DSU, which provides 
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that reports must state the basic rationale for the findings and recommendations. This applies to 
both panels and to the Appellate Body. If you had a report that cut-and-pasted the text of the 
relevant legal obligation, and cut-and-pasted the text of measure at issue, and then simply stated 
who had won, that would not be a report. That would not be a report that is consistent with 
anything agreed by the membership. A report must make a connection between law on the one 
hand and the facts on the other hand. This is what I would call a bridge of reason. And one of 
the problems I have with the current discourse is that, under the guise ….sometimes of the terms 
‘gap filling’ or ‘activism’, people proceed as if there is a problem with the existence of the bridge 
of reason. But in fact, the bridge of reason must be there in every single case. It is the very 
essence of the judicial function. If you deny that it should exist, either you’re saying there should 
be no dispute settlement in accordance with the agreed treaties or that it should be entirely 
arbitrary and therefore inconsistent with the basic objective of security and predictability and the 
rules against non-discrimination. Neither of those propositions are consistent with the WTO 
agreement. So we have to get past the idea that there’s a problem if the judges explain how they 
have applied the law to the facts. That is what they are required to do. Bridge of reason, I’d like 
to say it a thousand times because apparently if you repeat something often enough, it gains 
currency.  
 
And my second point goes to that term ‘activism’. Now, I don’t want to get into it in isolation, 
because we are all fed up of that empty debate. But the term ‘activism’ is used in a pejorative way 
with respect to something that judges do which the speaker is said to dislike. And the 
fundamental problem that I have is that there are three words missing from that discourse, which 
is essentially a political discourse, and not a legal one. We need to find those three words to 
complete the picture so that we can have a balanced discussion about any of this. And those 
three words are utterly missing from the debate at the moment. I don’t mind what the three 
words might be, but they do need to be as pejorative as the word ‘activism’, and the first needs to 
describe when judges do something that we like, the second needs to describe when judges don’t 
do something that we like, and the third needs to describe when judges don’t do something that 
we dislike. Logically, these three words would complete the set of four words that you need to 
have this discourse. I don’t mind what the words are. I have proposed for a word for what the 
judges do that we like ‘judicial engagement’. So we don’t want a judge that is activist but we 
certainly do need a judge that engages. For a word that describes what judges don’t do that we 
like, I think that’s easy enough: ‘judicial restraint’. And for a word describing when judges don't 
do something and we dislike that, I suggest ‘judicial default’.  
 
I do not think you can have a meaningful discussion about the relevant issues, that is, enter into a 
critical assessment of a system of adjudication, unless you have these four analytical tools to 
hand. So, not just judicial activism, but judicial engagement, judicial restraint and judicial default. 
I think judicial activism is deciding outside your mandate or deciding issues that are not necessary 
for resolving the dispute. On the other hand, judicial engagement, the virtue of judicial 
engagement, requires, and indeed mandates the judge to set out the law, set out the facts and set 
out the bridge of reason. Without this minimum, the judge is not engaged in the task that they 
have been mandated to carry out. Judicial restraint would mean not interpreting the context. 
Context is just a tool to interpret the terms of the treaty where you find the obligation or right. 
We should not be interpreting context, and refraining from doing so represents the judicial virtue 
of restraint. Finally, we do want our judges to resolve the dispute. If they fail to do so, they are 
denying justice to the parties. And that is the judicial error of ‘default’. And the judicial error of 
default is as serious as and probably worse than the judicial error of activism.  
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So these are my two points. Can we please address ourselves to the fundamentals of the 
vocabulary that we are using? Can we all please take on board the significance of the bridge of 
reason? Can we please complete the vocabulary of the discussion with these other three terms, 
whatever you want to use, I don’t mind, so that we can have a balanced discussion. Because I 
honestly believe that if we look through that lens, we will reach the right conclusion, which is that 
there is nothing seriously wrong with the system at present, and the proposition that there is, is 
an illusion that has been created for political reasons. 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much for this clear explanation and position. I turn now to Ms. Brandon from 
the Permanent Mission of India. Please. 
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you. Well, a true story is here appropriate. I remember once in my early days at the 
Appellate Body, our Secretariat in order to use all the time available had proposed to the parties 
that the hearing take place on August 10. Upon that, first a representative of the EU Commission 
came alarmed to our premises saying, ‘Look I have reserved a sailing boat with my family in 
Greece in August, these are the WTO vacations, please postpone the date of the hearing”. He 
was followed by the delegate involved of the other party a Latin American country, also objecting 
to the date: ‘I have home leave and I’m going back to South America’. So when I hear someone 
saying that the Appellate Body willfully disrespects the 90-day time limit, well I cannot but object 
having spent often Saturdays in this building, when it was deserted by everybody else be they 
staff or delegates, except the AB and its staff, instead of going skiing in Chamonix as everybody 
else, since I had to deal with such a fascinating issue as zeroing. Excuse me for this personal 
comment and I give the floor to Mr. Leivas Leite of the Brazilian Mission. 
 
Guilherme L. Leivas Leite 
 
Thank you Prof. Sacerdoti. First of all I would like to thank the WTI for this invitation and I’d 
like to say that Gita is also a very hard act to follow. I also have the same disclaimer to say my 
views are personal and they do not necessarily reflect the views of Brazil. So we 
have…nevertheless Brazil has tabled a proposal and we’d be happy to discuss this proposal 
during questions or other issues. But with regards to this issue of judicial economy and scope, I’d 
like to make some general comments and as a Brazilian I feel compelled to make a football 
analogy so just bear with me a little. I think one of the most overlooked beauties of football is its 
subjectivity, differently from Tennis for example, where the rules are very clear and the ball is off 
the line or inside or out or either you serve and it hits the net or not. Football has this continuous 
flow of play and the style of play is very much determined by the referee and in this sense and 
people usually don’t notice this because nobody roots for the referee, right? If anyone…that’s 
why you are a great lawyer!   
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James Flett 
 
Whenever there is a football match and my kids ask me who I am supporting, I always say I’m 
supporting the referee. 
  
Guilherme L. Leivas Leite  
 
You ever go to a soccer match, you’d see that people usually don’t like the referee or their mother 
but…and this is something very, very interesting because different countries have referees that 
set different style of play. For example- Brazilian referees are much more eager to call foul than 
European referees. That is why for example, you saw Neymar at the World Cup, he’s on the 
floor. That’s something…that is how football is played in Brazil. You try to get more fouls 
because you know the referee would call more fouls and when Brazilian players come to play in 
Europe, they see that it doesn’t really work and they have to adapt…and so, I think with these 
issues of scope and what is judicial economy or what is…what is issue of law, issue of fact, these 
are concepts and they are black and white. So, I think much of the idea for reform or the 
importance of the Appellate Body isn’t so much in deciding this or that case and I think that 
James made an excellent point of the partiality of the parties when they are criticizing the 
Appellate Body…and so…it’s very hard to judge the Appellate Body only on its substance, but, I 
think much of the issues here with regard have to do with the style of play of the Appellate 
Body…and just as an example, with regard to Article 11 appeals. Article 11 appeals…the 
Appellate Body has since the very beginning, they established a very large…strict threshold for 
Article 11 appeals saying that a challenge under…US Steel safeguards...the challenge under 
Article 11 of the DSU must not be vague or ambiguous and it is not to be made lightly and with 
regards to substance, from 2016 up to now I think there were eleven Article 11 appeals and only 
two were decided favourably to the appellant, but, there seems to be a certain disconnect 
because…if you think just of incentives, I mean, parties are incentivized for making Article 11 
appeals even though their chances are very, very slim of obtaining that appeal and I think that 
might be an issue of style of play procedurally, with regards to the Appellate Body in the sense 
that while…in the…decision…in the substance they might not give the appellant the decision, 
but they still, for lack of a better word, they cater to that appeal which at many times is very 
ambiguous, is very vague and there are, for example, hearing many, many questions, just trying to 
ask what the appellant is asking for in its Article 11 appeal. So, in that sense there is a, how can I 
say… a style of play, let’s say, how the game is played even in a different connection than just 
what the substance is. So…just a final point, I think because parties are so partial in this issue and 
even though they may say while we need to exercise the restraint and politically, they say that, 
when it gets to the case they want to win, that’s usually what they want and so, they are never 
going to say ‘good job, referee. Thank you very much’, they want the goals, but that is why so 
many times the referee is underrated and I think that is an important point we need to think 
about when we are talking about…the scope. Thank you.    
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much. As a former referee, coming from Italy, I appreciate a lot your reference 
to football. 
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Maria Alcover 
 
Thank you to the WTI and Peter Van den Bossche for inviting me here today. We’ve been given 
five minutes each, which is quite challenging, but I think we’re doing a great job so far. Going to 
the 'scope and timeframe of Appellate Body review', which is the topic of our session, there’s a 
line of argument I’ve been hearing that goes like this: the Appellate Body has been doing more 
than what it should do – addressing issues it shouldn’t address because they go beyond what is 
strictly necessary to resolve the dispute – and this has led to longer reports, which in turn has 
caused delays in circulation beyond the ninety-day deadline imposed by the DSU. I’m not sure 
this is an entirely accurate picture. In my view, the Appellate Body has been doing its very best to 
resolve the issues before it, taking into account that the DSU is not a perfect agreement and it 
certainly doesn’t solve all the questions that may possibly arise in a particular dispute. The 
Appellate Body has had to find ways to deal with every new challenge posed by every new 
dispute. And it has done, to the best of its ability. Now, having said that, I agree with James that 
there’s always room for improvement. To the extent that Members feel now that, after more than 
twenty years of experience with an Appellate Body, it is time to clarify certain rules regarding how 
the Appellate Body conducts its reviews, it might be a good time to do so. And if by doing so we 
get to keep the dispute settlement system as we know it – with an Appellate Body in it – that 
would appear to me to be an ideal outcome. In other words, if by fixing these rather technical 
issues that we are going to discuss today, we get better chances to save the dispute settlement 
system, well, it is worth a try. I admit that it’s hard to be 100% sure that this is going to be the 
case, given that, in addition to these rather technical concerns there are also political concerns 
involved. But let’s for now address the technical concerns here, which are ‘scope’ and ‘timeframe’ 
of appellate review. There are two key questions: What should the Appellate Body address? 
(scope) And when should the Appellate Body stop because it has done enough to resolve the 
dispute? (judicial economy). With respect to what should the Appellate Body address, there’s 
been much controversy around the treatment of 'municipal law'. We all know that the Appellate 
Body is supposed to address only issues of law, but, in practice, the line dividing facts and law 
becomes very thin sometimes. Regarding municipal law, in particular, is it an issue of law? Is it an 
issue of fact? There has been a lot of debate around it. Among those Members that have 
submitted reform proposals, the majority has suggested that the meaning of municipal law should 
be treated as an issue of fact. In this sense, regardless of our personal views on the topic, if we 
think these proposals help clarifying the scope of appellate review, I don't see why we should not 
welcome them. Article 11 of the DSU claims are another issue that raises challenges for 
delimiting the scope of review of the Appellate Body when it comes to examine the Panel’s 
assessment of facts. Some consider that the Appellate Body has gone too far when examining 
Article 11 of the DSU claims; others consider that it has done a pretty good job.  I would be very 
interested in knowing what my co-panelists and the audience think about it. With respect to 
judicial economy, I think we all agree that, in general terms, it’s efficient for a court to be able to 
exercise judicial economy. It is efficient for panels and also for the Appellate Body, which has 
actually exercised it in the past, even though the DSU technically obliges it to address each and 
every issue raised on appeal. So, generally speaking, judicial economy seems to be a very efficient 
tool for adjudicators. I would like to raise the point, however, that before imposing a mandatory 
judicial economy rule for the Appellate Body – which is contemplated in some of the reform 
proposals – perhaps we should all agree on the meaning of "what is necessary to resolve a 
dispute". To me, resolving a dispute means knowing whether the challenged measure is WTO 
consistent or not. Having a short report that solves this question is, of course, the best outcome. 
But if we have a short report – thanks to judicial economy – that leaves us with a question mark 
as to whether the challenged measure is WTO consistent or not, well, that is definitely not ideal 
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for the parties in the dispute. This would bring us to the issue of completing the legal analysis, 
but, for the sake of time, I will leave it for the discussion afterwards.  
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much. I welcome Mr. Wauters join us now, so we’ll have here a view of the 
private sector’s use of the system on behalf of WTO members, let’s say. Thereafter we’ll open the 
floor to questions and then we’ll have a second round. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti  
 
Thank you very much. I think we have received a lot of food for thought in this first round. I see 
many requests to speak from the floor; I hope we will have time for everybody. I would like to 
make just one comment concerning a dialogue between the delegates of WTO members and the 
Appellate Body. This is included in some reform proposals also with a view of understanding 
how the Appellate Body organizes its work.  I would like to say something as to the first point. I 
believe that such a dialogue should be encouraged. However there has been a tradition in this 
house since the time of GATT of much confidentiality, separation of the roles. I remember 
within the DSU review, only once around 2003, the Australian Mission, when the Australian 
ambassador was the chair of the DSB, he took the initiative to have a meeting between Appellate 
Body members and interested delegations at the Australian Mission. Some delegate criticized the 
initiative saying, ‘well, we are the masters of the treaty, why should we listen to the Appellate 
Body members?’ On the other hand, some Appellate Body members said, ‘we must be impartial 
and independent and if we mix with delegations, someone will have suspicions’. In any case at the 
meeting a very interesting discussion took place in which the Appellate Body members clarified 
certain practical aspects of the proceedings and vice versa some delegates expressed their 
impressions and concerns. I think it is a pity that this experience has never been repeated since, 
as far as I know. 
 
The same issue, I think, of confidentiality or rather excessive confidentiality as to how the work 
of the Appellate Body is organized in order to meet the ninety days hampers an objective 
discussion of the issue. Many will have noticed that Panels now regularly publish, disseminate, 
they working rules and calendar, whereas at the Appellate Body level this is only discussed with 
the parties and is known only to them. It is not even known who are the three appellate body 
members on the division, until the report comes out, the original reason for this secrecy being 
that otherwise there may be attempts by parties to influence the three adjudicators. A calendar is 
made for each case and I think it should be disseminated more broadly so that everyone may 
understand the time constrains and how it is addressed. Thus, there are ten days for the appellant 
and thereafter for the appellee and other appellant to file their briefs. Thereafter another ten days 
for the third parties. Thereafter  you have a hearing, approximately 40 days from the beginning 
(thus in the middle of the 90-days period), to be followed by short successive periods of time for 
the Appellate Body’s Division in charge for preparing the first draft, then for discussing and  
reviewing it, thereafter  to have a second draft. A very tight frame, I can tell you, especially 
considering that at times not all AB members involved are together in Geneva.. You may have a 
second case pending that you have to fit it in, and if there is also   a third case and you need to fit 
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in the various engagements that this overlapping involves, I can assure you that 90 days will not 
be sufficient, without considering that at least two weeks are needed for translation and review of 
them by the Ab secretariat. The staff is not enough to follow all the requirements of assisting the 
Divisions in the drafting, reviews and revisions. Not to speak of the WTO holidays, that 
someone could be ill and so on. So I think more transparency would also dispel some suspicion 
by someone that the Appellate Body is not respecting by its own will, and not because of 
unavoidable constraints, the very strict 90-day timeline. It is not by chance that this is a unique 
feature of the WTO dispute settlement system which is not found in any other international 
adjudication mechanism. 
 
Rambod Behboodi  
 
Thank you very much, professor Sacerdoti. Rambod Behboodi, King & Spaulding, formerly the 
Government of Canada. 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Also a former student of mine in The Hague! 
 
Rambod Behboodi  
 
Indeed and always a personal view rather than any other view attributable to any other 
organization. Lots of food for thought but let me just…because Article 11 was raised and 
because the ninety day issue has been branded about, let me just a pose a question, I’ll start with 
James.  Let me just pose a question about analytical methodology that goes to the heart of an 
appellate court or an appellate instance’s legitimacy.  
 
You’ve got Articles 11 and 13 of the DSU; each contains a hortatory “should” that has been 
interpreted as a concrete legal obligation – “shall”. I’ve written an article about Article 13; I 
started working on Article 11 but I gave up because I couldn’t make heads or tails of what the 
Appellate Body was doing over the last twenty years. Thank you very much Jasper for identifying 
some of the issues, but you’ve got basically short hortatory language, basic, very simple, basic 
hortatory language in key provisions of the DSU that apply to panels and to Members.  And then 
you’ve got the multiple ‘shalls’ in Article 17 that the Appellate Body has decided to be flexible or 
reasonable about, you know, the ninety days issue, or the confidentiality requirement.  So you’ve 
got an institution that considers obligations as hortatory when they apply to itself or “flexible” 
when it applies to itself, but non-obligations as obligations where other instances are concerned. 
Do you not have a problem of legitimacy? These are not about some obscure provisions in the 
DSU; more than that, we see the same type of dynamic happening in respect of other obligations, 
in the other 550 pages of the agreement. So, as I said, I’m really focusing on two words - ‘should’ 
and ‘shall’ - in one agreement in three articles, but I see that as symptomatic of a bigger problem. 
 
Tom Miles 
 
Good morning, my name is Tom Miles, I‘m a journalist from Reuters. The US says that the 
ninety day rule has not been obeyed, so I feel all this discussion is about what the ninety day rule 
means…and you know, we’ll talk around it, it seems to be a dialogue of the deaf: they say you 
haven’t stuck to ninety days and presumably, they want the Appellate Body to stick to ninety days 
in the future, so the only way I can see out of that is if you were to come forward or if the WTO 
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were to come forward with some serious proposals about how to massively crunch the timeframe 
to make sure the ninety days’ time frame is achieved. Otherwise how can there be any 
compromise solution or how can there be any meeting of minds between the US and the people 
trying to solve this problem? Thanks. 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you. Yes, Alan Yanovich. 
 
Alan Yanovich  
 
The best way to get back to ninety days is to appoint the full Appellate Body and I’m being 
serious, I would be happy to be quoted on this one. I’m repeating myself; the best way to get 
back the ninety days is to appoint the Appellate Body members that have not been appointed. In 
other words, to remove the block. 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Yes, but recall my dilemma of the three requirements of which only two can be met at the same 
time: you can respect the ninety days if you address somehow the other two issues (cost 
constraints and quality of the decision), otherwise it becomes an impossible task. 
 
(unknown speaker 1) 
 
Yes, good morning Giorgio. I think when you discuss these ninety days, but the whole discussion 
but starting with this point, people forget that Appellate Body members are part-time, they are 
not full-time, they are paid by the day as experts according to administrative rules, so you have to 
take that also into consideration that they have other and the argument whether you should have 
permanent one or not, so that’s number one, then you have reality check, how could you have 
dealt with a case like Boeing in ninety days. It’s just impossible if you just see the amount of 
papers which are there. This brings me to the bigger thing. You speak about ‘judicial economy’ 
whether you could put/set limits, you speak about how to deal with municipal law, this business 
of municipal law has…a fact which dates back from the 20s is completely de passe in international 
law in general, in general international law. How can you decide whether a measure is compatible 
or not with agreements if you don’t interpret internal law, the measure as internal law as if you 
were dealing with law not facts. When they spoke about municipal law as fact, it meant only one 
thing that the judges were not supposed to know that law, because you know in general, this is... 
in Korea that the judge knows the law. Yes, he knows international law but not every internal 
law. So, that is why it was…the rule was formulated by the permanent court of international 
justice. All that indicates what? You cannot have an appellate body called Appellate Body, 
meaning a court of appeal, court de cassation which controls the interpretation and the application 
of the law to facts while reducing completely its autonomy as a tribunal. You either have a 
tribunal or you have something which is very simply to accommodate parties and these are two 
different concepts and I think all these small details which we are discussing relate to this. Are we 
speaking of a real tribunal or are we speaking of the club idea of GATT? If it is club idea of 
GATT, then of course you can do what you want, but a tribunal has a meaning and has a 
minimum range of freedom which cannot go beyond a certain point, otherwise it loses its nature 
as a judicial function. Thank you. 
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Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you. The floor is for Gabrielle Marceau. 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Good morning, I am speaking in my personal capacity.  I think Prof. Abi-Saab, as always, has put 
his finger on a fundamental issue, that is the nature of the dispute settlement system.  We are well 
aware of the differences between EU and US on this matter.   I would like to get your views or 
comments on a point of the proposal from Chinese Taipei on this issue of ninety days where it 
says that the very timeframe, the tight timeframe of 17.5 DSU for 90 days maximum may not be 
interpreted as simply "outdated or bad piece of legislation", instead it might be viewed as 
"another element laid down deliberately by negotiators in order to circumscribe the Appellate 
Body function".  I don’t like the word circumscribe but the point is that ninety days would not 
only be a procedural rule, it would have been an explicit choice of governments, like the choice 
of having only seven judge, seven members of the AB, not fifteen like the ICJ, and only ninety 
days. So this, maybe…, was purposely negotiated in order to qualify the type of dispute 
settlement system:  not as a full court, maybe more than simple arbitration…, what do you think? 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you. When I studied the matter, I was told the ninety days were inserted because in the US 
Trade Laws section 301 had a similar time frame and the US would accept not to proceed 
unilaterally with its measures provided that the review in Geneva would be quick. Hence this 
short term, not because of some idea on the time requirement of the proceedings envisaged.  
 
Kholofelo Kugler 
 
Good morning, my name is Kholofelo Kugler from ACWL. Is there scope to turn the mirror 
around? Because one of the panelists said that this mirror’s been shown to us regarding the AB 
and the dispute settlement system and how it works. What about turning the mirror around to 
the members themselves? And asking if there’s scope really to adopt those authoritative 
interpretations and move forward? I think Maria may have suggested that there are some things 
that have agreement - maybe on municipal law as an issue of fact. So, should we really point 
fingers at the AB? Or should we start thinking about how we can move forward as a 
membership? As the DSB, in adopting rules that really work. Part of the problem, obviously, is a 
systemic issue. The negotiating function is just defunct and so maybe we should start accepting 
the truth and stop point fingers at the AB alone. I’m not an AB apologist but we really need to 
think about how, as Members, this deadlock can be resolved.  
 
(unknown speaker 2) 
 
Thank you…sorry…apologies…I want to follow up on what Jasper said and this point about 
Article 11 and has the Appellate Body gone too far, but then the recognition that often it is the 
lawyers who raise a lot of Article 11 claims. What do you think the Appellate Body should do? 
You have a case in which the appellant raises ten-fifteen Article 11 claims, what should it do? 
What would save the Appellate Body from being criticized for either doing too much or too little 
in those circumstances? 
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Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
We come back to our panelists in the same order. 
 
James Flett 
 
So the first point I’d like to comment on is the ninety day point. I think this has been raised by a 
number of questions. I think there is no ninety day problem at all. I think it’s just an illusion. And 
I think you need to make a very strict separation between the law and the politics. If you look at 
the law, the situation is that 17.14 states clearly that the report is adopted thirty days after 
circulation. That’s it. It doesn’t say circulation within the ninety days provided for in 17.5. There 
are other provisions of the DSU that tie together temporal consequences, but not Articles 17.14 
and 17.5. Second, when that ninety-day limit is not respected, the Appellate Body violates an 
obligation in a treaty, which violation is attributable to the World Trade Organization, as a matter 
of public international law. If we look at the regulating instrument of public international law, 
which is the International Law Commission draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, we will find in its Article 10.2 that it states expressly, and this is an extremely well 
known problem, that when an international organization breaches an international obligation, 
including towards its own members, and including as a result of failing to comply with one of the 
rules of the organization - this is written in the ILC Articles and explained at a great length in the 
commentaries - the WTO is exposed as a result of that, and an aggrieved Member in theory can 
seek reparation. Now for various technical reasons that cause of action would be rather unlikely 
to be successful, but legally…legally there is a consequence to the breach of 17.5 by the Appellate 
Body and the WTO. Please download that piece of information, because an enormous amount of 
the subsequent discussion is grounded on the assertion that it can’t be that there is no 
consequence. But there is a consequence, and it’s the one I have just described. That is the law, 
that’s what the law says. Now, I hear a number of people offering opinions about why the law is 
drafted the way it is drafted. That is very interesting. But that is politics, not law.  
 
This is the reality of the situation with respect to the ninety day rule. So, it may be that some 
members are dissatisfied with the prospect of the remedies that are available to them in public 
international law generally, and it may be that they want to change the treaties accordingly. That’s 
a political question, it’s not a legal question. And in any event, in my opinion, it certainly doesn’t 
justify bringing the entire dispute settlement system to a grinding halt.  And I don’t think the rest 
of the membership can accept or should accept that sort of approach. That is on the ninety day 
rule. Please let’s distinguish between what the law says and various political opinions. So there is 
no problem, it’s a politically orchestrated attack on the Appellate Body and the dispute settlement 
system and on the WTO.  
 
The second thing I would like to say is that I would like have the great temerity to respond to 
Professor Abi-Saab's eloquent intervention and also the great temerity to agree with it 
wholeheartedly. And I should of course say, like all the other speakers, I’m speaking in a personal 
capacity. In particular, on this issue, I’m commenting on the law as it currently stands, and based 
on Appellate Body case law. I’m not commenting on any of the proposals that have been made 
for alterations to the text of the treaties. The point to note here is that the bridge of reason can 
be constructed deductively, from the general to the specific, from the law to the facts. 
Alternatively, it can be constructed inductively from the specific to the general, that is, from the 
facts to the law. There are two different ways of constructing the bridge of reason. The bridge of 
reason consists of inferences which are drawn either from a combination of treaty terms, stated 
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using the terms actually used by the treaty, or a combination of facts stated using the words of 
municipal law. Article 17.6 of the DSU states clearly that the Appellate Body is responsible for 
the deductive bridge of reason, that is, the way in which the law has been interpreted and applied; 
it’s unequivocal, it is in Article 17.6. That is the territory of the Appellate Body. If you say, ‘hang 
on, the appellate body can’t touch inductive reasoning engaged in by a panel, departing from the 
words actually used in municipal law, with a series of inferences to construct a bridge of reason 
from the other end’, then you are saying that the Appellate Body has no control over the bridge 
of reason, and that is inconsistent with what is stated in Article 17.6 of the DSU. And if at the 
same time, like Rambod, you say there is nothing in Article 11 but the term "should", which 
doesn’t mean anything, then the Appellate Body has nothing to do at all, unless the panel writes 
down the treaty obligation using the wrong words, which it is obviously not going to do. I hope 
that’s clear. This is what those who are adopting these kinds of positions are advocating for. No 
Appellate Body at all, effectively. That is, a dispute settlement system that does not achieve the 
objective of security and predictability and that will result in discrimination between Members, 
probably as a function of how much power they have. So thank you Professor Abi-Saab for 
putting us all straight on what the law is today. One can have different political views on what the 
laws might look like in the future if we change the words, but today, this is the situation. Thank 
you Professor Abi-Saab. Could we all please listen to the tremendous wisdom that we hear?   
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you. Mrs. Brandon, your turn. 
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much. Now, Mr. Leite. 
 
Guilherme L. Leivas Leite 
 
Thank you. I think a very important point raised by Gita here is that how do you encompass all 
these different judicial worldviews? But, I guess that’s what an international agreement is and an 
international agreement has a lot of this constructive ambiguity, so even though there is strong 
language in some provisions or in others, this is exactly to accommodate these different 
worldviews and the practice of members is also very important with regards to these 
provisions… I think that’s a great example with regards to the letters because it wasn’t a 
very…initiative blowing out of proportion because of a political reason now but was easily 
accommodated with the practice of members and other issues, for example, sequencing, it was a 
very large schism which actually did raise a very significant crisis… I mean, maybe not in the size 
of this one but after…was in the Banana’s dispute where there was a schism, the schism I 
understand still goes on regarding sequencing, but I mean, parties have now drafted sequencing 
agreements which are usually done, it takes a little more time, it’s a little more work but it’s easily 
accommodated…what you can say a very differing worldviews there so, what I am trying to say is 
that I agree with James that you can’t mix political issues with legal issues, but when we have a 
political issue here, it’s very hard to solve them just by using law. I really like law, I went to law 
school, I work here, I love this issue but we need to know that law doesn’t solve everything and 
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so when we get very anxious and very…debating the legal issues when we’re trying to solve a 
political issue and it really doesn’t get us anywhere. 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much. I agree. My comment would be: beware of solving political issue by 
undermining a legal structure. If we devise something that will not work it will take another 
twenty years to solve it. 
  
Maria Alcover 
 
Thank you. I agree with what Guilherme just said; we are discussing technical/legal issues here, 
but we all know there are broader political issues at stake. Perhaps, however, it is wise to at least 
try to fix the technical issues and see if, by fixing these technicalities, we can somehow get closer 
to fixing the bigger problem. I also wanted to make a very brief comment regarding the ninety 
days issue, which I myself have had trouble understanding in full. Indeed, it is hard to know 
exactly where the problem lies. Is it that the ninety-day deadline is in itself too short and that’s 
why we need to extend it to 120-150 or 200? Is the problem that an Appellate Body report 
circulated beyond the ninety-day deadline is no longer an Appellate Body report subject to 
negative consensus? Like James, this reading puzzles me because the DSU does not expressly say 
so. Or is the problem that, as Gita mentioned, the Appellate Body stopped consulting with the 
parties when extending the ninety-day deadline? It seems that we can approach the ninety-day 
problem from different angles, but we have to identify the specific concern at stake. I would also 
like to echo what Giorgio said at the beginning, sometimes Members (and lawyers) want to have 
it all: we want to submit hundreds of pages in an appellant or appellee submission, and we want 
to include many Article 11 of the DSU claims; but we also expect a high-quality Appellate Body 
report, one that addresses each of our arguments, gives sound reasoning for each of its 
conclusions, and, on top of that, is circulated in ninety days. I think, at some point, we have to 
agree that that’s just not possible. So we have to tackle different aspects of the dispute settlement 
system to really solve the problem in its entirety; perhaps it is necessary to start disciplining the 
parties in a dispute to some extent. And let me make a final comment with respect to the issue of 
‘shall’ and ‘should’, which I thought was an interesting point. Again, sometimes, we want it all, 
but our views and arguments are not entirely consistent. We want to interpret ‘shall’ in a very 
strict manner in a specific provision, but we want the term to be laxer in another provision. For 
instance, we want a strict ninety-day rule, because the DSU states that the report ‘shall’ be 
circulated within ninety days. However, when the DSU establishes that the Appellate Body 'shall' 
address each of the issues raised on appeal, we are ready to read the word 'shall' less strictly 
because judicial economy might be a good idea in a particular case. We should be aware that we 
tend to be selective as to the meaning of a particular term, depending on the context in which it 
appears. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
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Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
Thank you very much. We have been very respectful of the clock: we were allotted in this panel 
not ninety days, but ninety minutes and we still have four minutes left to make use of all the 
ninety minutes. I can take therefore another question or two. Mr. Do Prado please. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 
 
By way of conclusion, I personally would agree with Victor, but it is also true that the US has in 
detail set down its concerns or objections to the current application of the DSU rules in AB 
proceedings and other members have reacted to that. The United States have not articulated their 
proposals, contrary to what other WTO members have done. These proposals to do not 
contemplate that the Appellate Body should become just a kind of super panel that in isolation 
gives opinions on major errors that Panels may occasionally make. If this was the original idea of 
certain parties it does not correspond to the scheme of the DSU provision. We have used our 90 
minutes and therefore we stop. We will resume with the second panel at 11:05. Thank you very 
much to all for this interesting debate.     
xxxx 
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Session 2 
Judicial activism and precedent 
 
  
Chair:  Gabrielle Marceau, Associate Professor, UNIGE; Legal Affairs 
Division, WTO, Geneva 
 
Panellists:  Katherine Connolly, Sidley Austin LLP, Geneva 
Philippe De Baere, Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels  
Michael Hahn, World Trade Institute, University of Bern 
Alana Lanza, Permanent Mission of Honduras to the WTO, 
Geneva 
Robert McDougall, Cadence Global Ltd; Centre for 
International Governance Innovation 
Niall Meagher, Advisory Center on WTO Law, Geneva 
 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Good morning. This session is somehow like the first one, concentrating on two of the so-called 
‘US concerns’.  I think that what came out clearly from the first session is that some speakers are 
of the view that the problem of the AB crisis is much more than technical. For those who were 
here a few months ago, we had another conference by WTI, and some people were asking ‘why is 
it that there’s such a focus on the Appellate Body if there are other problems in the WTO? and if 
the Appellate Body is only part of the bigger problem, the issue is therefore political rather than 
legal, so why look at it only from a legal and technical perspective?’. Remember, at the time, I 
referred to the word ‘leverage’ (between blocking the AB and other WTO problems) and I was 
bullied by some of my colleagues who were saying “what is this, you are a lawyer?”. Today, I still 
think it’s useful to look at possible problems specific to the AB and needs for reforms, even if we 
reach a conclusion that they are problems with the AB, or that are problems also elsewhere in the 
WTO. The AB problems we look at today on this panel are allegations of judicial activism, 
allegations of false rule on precedents and we have divided the themes amongst speakers.  
Philippe and Niall will talk about judicial activism and respond to some of the questions like ‘Is it 
possible, for instance, to have proper interpretation under customary international rules of 
interpretation that would nonetheless be judicial activism?' Philippe and Niall will also discuss 
judicial activism, and then Katherine and Alana will speak about  precedents;  afterwards Michael 
will talk about those mechanisms suggested to review what the Appellate Body does.  The first 
speaker will be Robert who will talk about all those issues, focusing on the content of the current 
reform proposals and their policy environment. Like the previous panel, each speaker will speak 
about 5 minutes and unless there’s an urge to comment on each other, we’ll go to the floor. So 
Robert, what is judicial activism and what is the problem with precedent, if any, what about 
review mechanisms and what is the essence of those proposals in their context.   
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Robert McDougall 
 
Thanks Gabrielle. Let me start by saying thanks also to the WTI, and Peter in particular, for 
organizing another very timely conference. I’m just pleased, and perhaps a bit surprised, to be 
invited back again to participate, especially with such a distinguished group of speakers.  
 
I also just want to say at the outset that I’m pleased that all of you now get to share the 
tremendous joy that so many of us have had to experience over the years that have been involved 
in the DSU Review. That includes endless debates and arguments, largely about the same issues 
and with little hope of progress or convergence. After a while, most participants in DSU review 
just eventually come to call it a ‘dispute settlement debate club’. 
 
I fear though that these discussions, both among the members and on the margins and in 
conferences like this, have about as much chance of being successful and are starting to take on 
the same character as the DSU Review. Because as in the DSU Review, the tendency was always, 
and presumably is still, to try to “litigate” US concerns and to try to resolve the impasse through 
legal arguments rather than negotiation, a point that was made at the very end of the last panel by 
Victor. But just as we couldn’t argue our way out of the DSU Review, with the tables now turned 
on the consensus rules – effectively, the US has externalized the DSU Review, with the same 
issues that have been argued about for the last 15 years – with the consensus rules now reversed, 
we’re not likely going to be able to argue our way out of this impasse.  
 
The allegations the US makes that are related to this panel are that the Appellate Body engages in 
advisory opinions, that it modifies rights and obligations of members, and that it places too much 
emphasis on the authority of its previous reports. By the way, I searched over the last couple of 
days for any reference by the US to “judicial activism” or “judicial over-reach” and it’s not the 
term they use, so I think it’s unhelpful to consider the politicization of the terminology. They 
make very specific arguments about the things they say the Appellate Body engages in, all of 
which they say are exceeding its mandate.  
 
The reactions so far from others have fallen into three categories:  
1) some – in conferences like these and in blog articles – argue that as a matter of law, these 
things do not happen or if they do, they are either a necessary or an implicit feature of the 
system or the evolution of the system. And with all due respect to the organizers of this 
conference, some of the indicative questions were shared foster this kind of debate about 
the existence of what’s happening.  
2) In terms of the actual proposals, some WTO members have proposed to explicitly allow 
these practices or alternatively to protect the Appellate Body from the appraisals if it 
engages in them.  
3) Other members have proposed the adoption of guidelines to remind the Appellate Body 
that it can’t engage in the practices.  
 
So far, the United States seems relatively unmoved and has called instead for focus on the two 
questions that it set out in the General Council intervention a couple of weeks ago: 1) why the 
Appellate Body has felt free to depart from what the members agreed; and, 2) why the 
membership itself has been so reluctant to take corrective action. These are important signals 
from the United States about what it seeks in the reform exercise and it might be an opportunity 
to talk about those questions rather than underlying legal questions.  
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Like it or not, or agree with it or not, the United States doesn’t seem too inclined to “litigate” its 
complaints. These discussions are all very interesting and they may be useful in future with a 
revived Appellate Body with a new mandate to figure out what the limits and scope of the new 
mandate is, but the current context there is not much argumentation which seems likely to 
change US view on the nature of its claims. 
 
It’s not likely possible or productive or even necessary to try to settle the question of whether or 
not, and to what extent, the Appellate Body actually engages in so-called “judicial activism” and 
“judicial overreach”. But it should nonetheless be reasonable or possible to reach an agreement 
on reasonable modifications to the system, without prejudice to one’s position on the nature and 
scope of the underlying problem.  
 
First, this would certainly need to include a number of the points of clarification of the mandate, 
possibly even narrowing the mandate. Many of the proposals go in that direction and discussions 
like these today can help to clarify the proposals. But on their own, they are likely to be 
insufficient to resolve the impasse. A lot of these issues in any event can be regulated through 
clarification and still end up with the same kind of problems where they’ll still need to be 
implemented somehow and understood. As the US said in the General Council aa few weeks ago: 
“there’s no reason to believe that simply adopting new or additional language, in whatever form, 
would be effective in addressing its concerns”.  
 
Second, the US suggested, as it has suggested for many years, the need to focus on effective 
accountability mechanisms or counterbalance to operationalize the existing members’ right to 
collectively interpret their commitments. In the DSU Review, the US has for fifteen years, called 
this “member control” and while its proposed form of “member control” in the DSU has always 
been wrongheaded, the nature of its concerns have not been wrong. Any well-functioning 
domestic system of law that has developed the kind of inverted imbalance between its judicial 
and political organs as we now see in the WTO, would eventually face a constitutional crisis. 
There’s no reason to expect a different outcome at the international level. None of the current 
proposals come even close to addressing that particular issue other than the question about a 
meeting between the DSB and the AB. If we get a second round, I’ll have a few comments on 
that. 
 
And third, the US seems to want to change the culture of the dispute settlement system. A 
culture based on adjudicator restraint and humility would result in less risk of obiter, less risk of 
modifying rights, and less risk of strict adherence to past reports.  
 
At this point though members have a choice – a choice that others have referred to. They can 
continue to insist on a vision of a Dispute Settlement System and an institution that has lost the 
trust of the one of the original and principle architects, even if it means excluding it from that 
system. Most of the afternoon is going to be spent on how the US can be excluded from that 
system. Or members can try to find a way to keep their largest trading partner subject to a 
binding dispute settlement system, even if it means modifying the system to reflect changing 
political realities and changing expectations.  
 
My main point today, my closing point, is that this choice cannot be simply made on the basis of 
technocratic criteria and legal argumentation. It is now, as many referred to this morning, a 
political choice and a political question, one that has to be decided on the basis of how badly 
members want to keep the United States subject to a binding dispute settlement system, albeit 
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that one might have to roll back some of the controversial developments that have occurred over 
the last 25 years. Thank you.  
 
Philippe De Baere 
 
Thank you, first of all for inviting me to this very interesting workshop. Thank you also Gabrielle 
for sending me two very interesting questions and let me read them out to you before I start. 
First, can the clarification of a legal provision in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law amount to judicial activism? Second, even more 
challenging, are there objective criteria to determine whether the clarification of legal provision 
amounts to judicial activism? Trying to find an answer to both questions, I obviously turned to 
the Oxford English Dictionary to find ‘judicial activism’. Unfortunately, there is no clear 
definition to be found there.  
 
As pointed out by previous speakers, allegations of judicial activism are often outcome dependant 
and will be raised by the losing party. In such instances, the parties will allege that the tribunal 
created new rules or misapplied the applicable interpretative methodology and as a result the 
tribunal created or imposed obligations on the party that went beyond the sacrosanct common 
intention of the drafters.  
 
Upon reflection, I came to the conclusion that any practical definition of judicial activism can 
only be formal, namely the departure from the correct interpretative method by the adjudicator. 
Whether the result is in line with the original intention of the drafters should be an irrelevant 
question. It is indeed incorrect to consider that the outcome of the interpretative process should 
be measured against an abstract yardstick which we would then call the intention of the parties. 
The intention of the parties is not some kind of ontological entity existing somewhere in outer 
space waiting to be discovered.  
 
The intention of the parties is precisely the outcome of the interpretative process. If the 
appropriate legal methodology is applied correctly, the result will correspond with the intention 
of the parties. Since under the dispute settlement understanding, the interpretative methodology 
to be followed is that of the Vienna Convention, its correct application cannot result in an 
outcome beyond the common intention and can therefore not constitute judicial activism. This 
answers the first question.  
 
This also means that accusations of judicial activism in fact relate either to the choice of an 
incorrect interpretative framework that would not rely on the Vienna Convention or the incorrect 
application of the correct interpretative methodology. Let me look a bit further than that. 
Obviously the choice of an interpretative methodology is not neutral; outcomes will vary between 
different methodologies. This should be quite obvious because legal text after all is foremost 
language and language unavoidably allows for multiple meanings. Speaking in Geneva which is 
the birthplace of Ferdinand de Saussure and the place where Borges is buried, all of us will be 
aware of the different meanings and uncertainties of legal meaning or meanings of words. We all 
know many examples.  For instance, if we talk about liberal in the US, we mean something else 
than when we talk about liberal in Europe. Or the word ‘chair’. As I am speaking, I have my chair 
besides me and under me.  
 
The important issue is therefore, how do we define the correct meaning, how do we choose the 
correct meaning?  And more importantly, who makes these choices and how is this done? For 
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the purpose of today’s discussion, I think the core issue here in the debate is really the weight to 
be given to the perceived intent of the parties at the time they agreed on a certain text. Or more 
precisely, what is the importance of the negotiating history or the preparatory work of the WTO 
treaty in the interpretative exercise. The Vienna Convention clearly gives the greatest weight to a 
text based analysis and relegates preparatory works and surrounding circumstances to a secondary 
role. This was different under the GATT where the perceived intention of the parties carried 
much more weight. Now, we all know the history of GATT and WTO, and if we look at who 
drafted the treaties it is clear that a limited number of countries have played a preponderant role 
in the drafting of the WTO treaties. It is therefore obvious that the adoption of an interpretative 
framework that gives less importance to preparatory works will result in a loss of influence over 
the outcomes by these powers. I believe that we can say that the European Communities, as the 
EU was called at the time, the US, Canada and a limited number of Western powers played a 
dominant role in the creation of the WTO treaties. This means that an excessive reliance on 
preparatory works and perceived intentions is actually playing in favour of these countries. In that 
sense, and here we come back to the previous panel, also here law meets politics: the choice of an 
interpretative method is actually a play for power.  
 
Finally, what must be understood as an incorrect application of the rules of the Vienna 
Convention? Does the Appellate Body make errors while applying the Vienna Conventions? It’s 
not because I will probably have to appear before the Appellate Body again but I consider it 
appropriate to take a formalistic approach and respond in the negative. This therefore means that 
the Appellate Body does not make errors. Obviously, applying the rules of the Vienna 
Convention, the Appellate Body has to make choices and we all know these choices:  ordinary 
meaning, do we use the Oxford English Dictionary or Wikipedia? Which edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary do we look at? If we see the word ‘comprise’ in the Vienna Convention, is 
this exhaustive or not? What kind of context do we take? What are the relevant rules of 
international law? One may agree or disagree with these choices but as long as they find a basis or 
hook in the Vienna Convention and follow judicial reasoning, one should consider them as 
correct. Indeed any legal system ultimately depends on the fiction that the highest court must 
always be right.  
 
The question therefore should not be so much whether the Appellate Body is correct but 
whether its decisions are considered as legitimate by stakeholders and this question brings us 
back to the balance between the legislative and the judicial branch in the WTO system and as 
Robert said, a solution must be found in re-calibrating these roles. I disagree with Robert in that I 
think that the change has to be preferably done to the legislative role of the WTO. The US 
disagrees with that but, in fact, if we look at the examples raised by the US on judicial activism or 
where the Appellate Body went outside its mandate, we see that often the examples cited spring 
from the concern by the Appellate Body to preserve the legitimacy and relevance of the WTO 
Agreements in the absence of a working legislative function. I will stop here and wait for your 
questions.  
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you very much. So, there is no real technical or legal problem with judicial activism if I 
hear you well, but there is an issue of legitimacy for some Members if the AB goes too far in its 
interpretation. Niall, what is judicial activism and do we have a problem? Judicial activism. What 
is it for you? 
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(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you, Niall. So judicial activism is invoked by a party when it loses but also and maybe 
more importantly, one's views on the legal nature of the dispute settlement system and on the 
method of interpretation will affect whether one believes there is judicial activism or not. Very 
good. Now we are going to discuss the issue of precedents which is another allegation or US 
concern, that there is new AB imposed rule of precedent - because of the AB use of this new 
term, ‘cogent reasons’ which for the USA is flawed. What is it this "cogent reason" business? 
Where does it come from? Who invented it? How does it link with the written principle of the 
DSU on the need to maintain "security and predictability"? Does it add to the DSU or is it just a 
confirmation? 
 
Katherine Connolly 
 
Thank you. I’ll just repeat what I said. In starting off the discussion on precedent, I’d be talking 
about what ‘cogent reason’ means, the origins, the context and more importantly whether I think 
it’s a helpful analytical tool to deal with the criticisms from the US we’ve had so far. So, of course 
cogent reason comes from the Appellate Body statement in Mexico Stainless Steel, sorry in US 
Stainless Steel that the panel made cogent reasons to depart from Appellate Body precedents and 
it’s has really become both particular term, cogent reasons have really become the focus of a lot 
of the discussions that have arisen out of the US criticism. We see that particularly in the DSB 
statement of the US last year where they talked repeatedly and very critically about what they 
called a cogent reasons approach. I think to understand what that means, what it means and if it 
is useful, you need to really put the statement in context in which it was made. And as most 
people in this room will know that came… US Stainless Steel came out of the zeroing disputes. 
For those of you that don’t know, I think we can all spare everybody a discussion on the 
technicalities of the anti-dumping margins, I may say that you come back to the next panel. 
Basically what happened is you had effectively a schism between the membership as in the 
content and the substance of the rules in the anti-dumping agreement and that schism played out 
and was reflected in the institutional bodies of WTO. So you had the US which adopted the 
methodology of zeroing that it said was WTO consistent. You had a number of WTO members 
that said it wasn’t WTO consistent and then you had a series of disputes where you had Panels 
adopting a pro-US position saying it was consistent that were overturned by the Appellate Body 
and then another dispute would come along and the Panel would adopt the same original 
position and the Appellate Body would overturn it and so on and so forth. So, you respectively 
got to a position by the time the Appellate Body’s report and the US Stainless Steel came along 
where you had a standoff between two institutional limbs of the WTO and that’s a very unusual 
situation that we haven’t seen since and it’s really important context from understanding why it 
was that the Appellate Body made that statement and used the language that they did. So, the 
Appellate Body was effectively in a position where it was trying to settle an institutional standoff 
and that’s the context in which you see language which is relatively strong from the Appellate 
Body about the hierarchical relationship between Panels and the Appellate Body, the 
consequences that it has for the roles of the respective bodies and of course security and 
predictability of the system and in that context, the Appellate Body said Panels need cogent 
reasons to depart from Appellate Body jurisprudence.  
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So I think in light of that context, there a couple of points that you can draw. The first is that 
even in that relatively extreme situation, the Appellate Body is very careful not to say that the 
Panel is legally bound to follow its decisions. The Appellate Body was asked to make a finding 
that in departing from its jurisprudence, the Panel had violated Article 11 and it declined to do 
so. So, it’s evident from what the Appellate Body said that this isn’t a legal requirement as such, 
and so I think the best way to understand it is that it’s treated effectively as a norm. So, it’s 
something that Panels should bear in mind for the sake of the institutional health of the system, 
that it’s a useful approach to follow the Appellate Body jurisprudence unless they have ‘cogent 
reasons’ otherwise, and I think that recognizes the fact that if you take a purely legalistic view of 
this issue, so if you look strictly at the DSU and you try to force a legal answer to this question, 
there is a tension in the DSU between on the one hand the existence of the Appellate Body 
review and the fact that, you know, as the DSU says the Appellate Body can overturn the 
decisions of the Panels on the one hand and on the other hand the fact that the Panels have the 
obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter themselves. So that tension exists legally 
in the DSU and the approach of, I think as the Appellate Body described it ‘cogent reasons’ is a 
way of resolving that dispute in a comfortable way that allows the system to function effectively 
taking into account the institutional policy health concerns about the functioning of the system. 
The second thing that I think the context of the Appellate Body statement tells us is that the 
zeroing disputes puts a stress and a pressure on that norm that had not existed before and hasn’t 
existed since. So, the Appellate Body was effectively put in a position of having to force the issue 
and to define as a legal matter exactly where the boundary lies in the Panel’s discretionary 
assessment of when it should and shouldn’t follow the Appellate Body’s precedent. That’s 
obviously a difficult question because there’s a gray area and that’s not one I think the DSU gives 
us a legalistic answer to. So, on the one hand you have a mechanistic, automatic approval of the 
Appellate Body’s decisions which I don’t think anybody thinks is a good idea, on the other hand 
you could have wanton and frequent disregarding of Panels, of bye Panels of Appellate Body 
jurisprudence which I also think that nobody thinks is a good idea.  
 
The appropriate boundary of what Panels should do lies somewhere in that gray area, and so 
90% of the disputes I think practitioners, members and Panels find that Panels are able fairly 
effectively to navigate that gray area boundary without necessarily having to find a strictly defined 
legal line of when they can and can’t overturn an Appellate Body jurisprudence. I think much of 
the debate on dispute settlement that we start to see, most of the time, it functions quite 
effectively. So as a matter of routine if you’re drafting a written submission, you fell to time to 
Appellate Body jurisprudence on things that have horizontal significant issues like burden of 
proof, like standard of review down to specific meaning of individual treaty terms, and that 
functions and it works as a practical matter the day to day functioning of dispute settlement, it’s 
effective without having to necessarily pin down exactly where that boundary lies and I think 
what you see in the controversy we’re finding in this laser focus on this term ‘cogent reasons’ and 
what do cogent reasons mean and where is that boundary? If you take that statement as a 
reflection of an accepted norm in which Panels will, for the most part, follow the Appellate Body 
jurisprudence because it’s sensible and it’s predictable and it’s useful for the system, I think that 
statement is useful. If on the other hand you’re looking at it in a context of where there is a really 
significant, substantive stress of on that norm where really what’s going on is not so much an 
issue of legal standard of when and when not to follow precedent, it’s really about a fundamental 
disagreement in the membership about the content and substance of the rules, I think that it 
starts to become a not particularly useful framework in which to understand it, because having to 
really to pin down that line as a matter of law, I don’t think we have the legal tools in the DSU 
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that fully allow us to do that and I think that this kind of harkens to some of the things that my 
fellow panelists have been talking about in the sense of it’s as much about the culture and 
acceptability and legitimacy as it is about necessarily trying to force this as a litigation issue and 
legal issue looking for bright-line distinctions, looking for legal tests on matters like this because 
this is the WTO, we have a different legal framework than we do, for example, in Common law 
system. So, with that kind of big caveat, basically I’m not certain that the idea of ‘cogent reasons’ 
is even necessarily useful and desirable analytical tool. I have been asked to explain what ‘cogent 
reasons’ are and it hasn’t been something that’s been like particularly extensively addressed in the 
jurisprudence but I think you can perceive two broad approaches which even in and of itself I 
think play up the limitations of the idea. Third, we’ve got China-Rare Earth which along with US 
-Countervailing & Anti-dumping Duties against China, which basically took a high threshold to 
this issue and I think particularly importantly took an approach which is cogent reason is 
something in addition to some extra ingredient, other than do disagreeing with the Panel’s 
interpretation. Third, the kinds of things that have been thrown out, some of them come from 
ICJ Jurisprudence, (35.34-35.36) the kinds of things thrown out are that the adjudicator was ill-
informed on the law. I’m not sure as a practitioner how you would demonstrate that, there’s been 
an alternative interpretation under Article 9 of the WTO Agreement, that the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation is unworkable in a particular set of circumstances. So, I was thinking about what 
that could mean and what that could be and I think it would be an example of where there’s 
circumvention for instance.  
 
The second approach, again unsurprisingly came of a zeroing case and I think this concerns my 
original point which is the Panel in a recent dispute on zeroing departed from the Appellate 
Body’s jurisprudence and I think kind of amusingly said that there cogent reasons for doing so 
was their objective assessment of the matter warranted an alternative interpretation. So, we’ve 
come full circle around to back to where we were, which I think demonstrates that this is 
ultimately probably not an issue that can be hashed out legally in dispute settlement but it is one 
that comes down to the substantive rules and it’s up to the members.      
   
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you very much. Still I’m not sure I understand the distinction between ‘cogent reason’ of 
the AB and "security and predictability" principle of the DSU.  The next panelist, Alana will 
continue our discussion about precedents and she will discuss some of the experiences with 
precedents in Latin American countries. 
 
Alana Lanza 
 
Good morning everyone. Thanks Gabrielle, thanks Peter for the invitation. So, as we all know 
there is no binding precedent in WTO dispute settlement system, as the Appellate Body has 
indicated that adopted Panel reports are only binding between parties. At the same time the 
Appellate Body has said that such reports create legitimate expectations and that Panels are thus 
expected to follow the interpretation offered by the Appellate Body in particular issues that are 
the same. So for those of you familiar with the proposals made by Honduras, you all know that 
they all include a series of options- options that originate from both extremes of the problem or 
the issue. With respect to the issue of precedent, we consider that there may be lessons to be 
learnt from legal systems of other countries. In our document on precedent, we suggested an 
approach inspired by Latin American legal system. Several Latin American countries adopt the 
method of creation of precedents wherein only legal issues decided are given way a certain 
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number of times are considered to have precedential value. In our proposal we suggest various 
ways of operationalizing this rule of reiteration and we took inspiration from examples like in 
Colombia, the Supreme Court uses the doctrina probable or probable doctrine as a flexible method 
to unify its jurisprudence and therefore create effective precedent. Three uniform decisions of the 
Supreme Court (38.45), as a cassation tribunal, on the same point constitute the doctrina probable. 
In Mexico, consistent rulings that have precedential weight are known as "jurisprudencia obligatoria". 
The precedent established by "jurisprudencia" is accepted once there are five consecutive and 
consistent decisions on a point of law by the Supreme Federal Court. But one case that is 
particularly interesting and draws much of our attention is the Brazilian example. In 2006, Brazil 
underwent an important legal reform in court procedure responding to a long debate on how to 
address court congestion, the heavy workload of the Brazilian Supreme Court and the role of 
higher courts in establishing case law. Sounds familiar, right? Yes. So, as creative as Brazilians can 
be, they came up with this legal figure called “súmula vinculante” which means literally binding 
pronouncement, and basically endows Supreme Court with the power of pronouncements with a 
binding effect. Such pronouncements have binding effect not only on the lower courts, but also 
on federal, states and municipal administrations. As a result, once a súmula is enacted, there is no 
need for cases to go all the way to Supreme Court to decide the issue, because lower courts are 
required to automatically apply the Supreme Court ruling. The Brazilian “súmula vinculante” 
confers binding effect on certain issues that have multiple law suits on the same question and 
only after reiterated decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court. Due to the exceptional character 
of binding effect of judicial decisions in traditional civil law jurisdictions, the Brazilian 
Constitution requires two-thirds majority of the Supreme Court Justices to approve, modify or 
annul a “súmula vinculante” through a special proceeding. These are all examples that we thought 
are worth considering our current discussions in the Appellate Body process because they all 
include an interesting mix of both common law and civil law system. With regards to the 
question ‘‘In deciding whether established case law is not ‘persuasive’ should a panel consider 
that WTO dispute settlement aims to bring security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system, we all know that the prime object and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is 
the prompt settlement of disputes between the WTO members, and to provide a security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system as it is enshrined in Article 3.2 of the DSU. As 
Katherine mentioned, in fact there is a degree of tension, undeniable tension, between those two 
principles and the tension arises if one postulates the freedom of Panels and the Appellate Body 
to depart from prior interpretations, because this could be seen as undermining the goals of 
security and predictability. On the other hand, if you take the principles of security and 
predictability to the extreme, this would require that prior interpretations could never be changed 
or departed from. This would then mean that Appellate Body reports would essentially have the 
same status as treaty obligations and provisions of the covered agreements themselves. So I 
believe the system needs to find a balance between these two propositions and I think this 
Appellate Body reform process is a good unique opportunity for members to strike this balance. 
Thank you.   
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you very much. Many Members in their proposals have referred to the possibility of 
having some sort of review mechanism of the Appellate Body decisions. And Michael will 
address two questions: should the Appellate Body's interpretations and decisions be reviewed by 
the DSB or by another body composed of representatives of WTO Members or of other 
international dignitaries? One of the original members of the Appellate Body, Prof Matsushita, 
years ago recommended the establishment of a committee of wise people to review the Appellate 
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Body reports. How could this work in real life and what could you tell us, Michael, about how to 
deal with the conclusions of such a wise men committee?  Would this mechanism be considered 
inappropriate? 
 
Michael Hahn 
 
Thank you very much Gabrielle, and, speaking for the WTI and myself, thank you very much 
Peter for organizing all of this. This is a tremendous event.  
 
As an aside, and in response to our colleague Guilherme: the Brazilian players of Liverpool FC 
do not fall easily and therefore, on the 1st of June, we will be Champions of Europe…. 
 
Before I turn to answering Peter’s guiding questions, allow me the following remark: Both Jasper 
and Robert brought a very important point to our discussion by highlighting that we should make 
an effort to take on a political perspective more often than we do in the framework of WTO law 
workshops. I think it is also very important to realize that the law, as important as it is, will not 
save us, as we can see when taking note of current developments. Only the adherence to certain 
(legal or extra-legal) norms and the ensuing behaviors will save us: reminding us of the 
importance of what actually happens in the real world is super-important and I salute my 
colleagues for doing that. Secondly, I would like to say that, nevertheless, discussing issues that 
seem very technical, very procedural and therefore as l’art pour l’art and (at first glance) only 
interesting for lawyers would overlook the fact that in a system which is as diverse culturally as 
the WTO system – with its 164 members and 20 plus observers –these kinds of technical issues 
and these kinds of technical discussions are the preconditions for giving legitimacy to both to the 
rules and to the adjudicatory process. This in turn makes (or made) them acceptable both to the 
US but also to China, to India but also to Brunei and so forth.  
 
The first question put to me reads:  
 
If Appellate Body interpretations of WTO provisions were to be reviewed by the DSB, a DSB committee or any 
other body composed of representatives of WTO Members, how would decisions on the correctness of the Appellate 
Body interpretation be taken? By consensus? By (qualified) majority vote?  
 
If I am not mistaken, nobody suggests a third instance, a super Appellate Body having the power 
to correct Panels and/or the Appellate Body. Rather, Philippe highlighted that when the highest 
body in that adjudicatory chain has spoken, we can safely assume (given the careful selection of 
the members of the Appellate Body) that methodologically the work product is correct, in the 
sense of legally and methodologically tenable. That doesn’t mean that decisions are viewed as 
being rightly decided: If I lost a case, I may be inclined to think that the decision is wrong. It does 
mean however, that the vast majority of users should have the sense that the report tackles all 
relevant aspects, in a proper juridical manner, brought up by the parties. We all have those cases, 
in our domestic jurisprudence and with regard to international case law, where we recognize the 
validity of the approach but are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the decision produces the 
wrong outcome.  
 
The question that has evaded an answer so far is: how members feed their unhappiness about the 
outcome (and sometimes the approach) back into the loop. Even under current WTO and DSU 
rules, the Dispute Settlement Body could have done and could do much more than what has 
been taking place up to now. We have heard from the Australian Ambassador’s efforts some 15 
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years ago to bring Appellate Body Members and Member states together. Obviously, it would be 
perfectly within the parameters established by present-day WTO law to set up a mechanism 
reminiscent of the 6th Committee to allow in-depth discussions of certain jurisprudential trends; 
these discussions could take place in private, so as to not endanger the independence, or, rather 
in public, in order to ensure maximum transparency.  
 
These and other possibilities have not been used. The feed-back given by Members consisted  
largely in public statements within the DSB, whereas no mechanism has evolved which would 
have allowed to condensate some concerns the membership has.  
 
As the US has correctly emphasized, we have already a tool in the toolbox of the DSU, namely 
the authoritative interpretation, Article 9 (2) DSU that would allow to correct Appellate Body 
report “outcomes”. Its last sentence is important, as it reminds us that the possibilities under that 
provision should not be replacing the provision on treaty amendment. Of course, if the 
Ministerial Conference or the General Council decide by consensus in a certain fashion, one could 
say that if everybody is on board, Members can determine whatever they want their agreement to 
say. While such an approach would be not revolutionary from the standpoint of the legal text, it 
would be revolutionary as a practical matter. I would submit, therefore, that for practical 
purposes, the bandwidth within which the General Council could operate would be somewhat 
more limited. But the Ministerial Conference could follow the example of the infamous German 
ordinance on the implementation of the Law on Chocolates, pursuant to which Easter Bunnies 
may be Santa Clauses for the purpose of this law.  
 
While almost everything seems possible if the contracting parties to the WTO agreement agree – 
if one wants, however, to keep an independent and binding dispute settlement mechanism, what 
is already on the books may be the best-suited options: the power of the DSB, on one hand, and 
Article 9 of the DSU, on the other hand.  
 
The second question which was put to me reads:  
 
On what basis could the DSB, a DSB committee or any other body composed of representatives of WTO Members 
come to the conclusion that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of a WTO provision is incorrect and reflects judicial 
activism? Would it be on the basis of a wrong application of the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law or could there also be another basis?  
 
As I already stated at the beginning: under current WTO law, an authoritative interpretation of a 
provision does not, in principle, question the methodological correctness of the Appellate Body’s 
Prior Art, but rather changes the outcome to align it with the preferences of the Membership. 
Therefore, nothing prevents the Members to come to a completely different conclusion than the 
Appellate Body, regardless of whether or not a majority of (or the whole) membership question 
the Appellate Body report’s methodological quality or whether it viewed as being convincing, 
tenable and logical. If the Members are of the opinion that there are systemic repercussions that 
may motivate them to treat Santa Clauses as Easter Bunnies for the purposes of the WTO 
Agreement or for the TBT Agreement, they can decide so.  
 
Again, I would submit that there would be more bandwidth, so to speak, if the decision was 
taken by consensus than rather if the decision was taken by three quarters. The three quarters 
decision making would be in any case crossing a frontier which so far has not been crossed and I 
leave that aside for the moment. Thank you very much and back to you, chair.   
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Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you. Initially, we had plans to give another series of comments to the panelists but let’s go 
back to the floor and in that context, panelists when they respond can add comments on each 
other. So the lady there at the very end, speak in the microphone.   
 
Antigoni Matthaiou 
 
Student from the Graduate Institute. Thank you very much for this interesting presentation. I 
would like to focus on the reform proposal Robert referred to, mainly the adoption of guidelines. 
So, Robert when you referred to this proposal, you said that the most effective solution would be 
to focus on accountability mechanisms. My question to you is, whether using the adoption of 
guidelines as a means of clarifying the delegation contract between the WTO Members and the 
Appellate Body could maybe serve as an instrument for increasing accountability and legitimacy 
of the AB. Then, again focusing on this issue of guidelines, Niall at the end of his speech referred 
to the use of a group of experts in the GATT era. I would like to ask whether the panel thinks 
that the use of a group of experts would be more effective in trying to reach the adoption of such 
guidelines in the sense that the discussion leading to the adoption of said guidelines would not be 
attached to the interest of specific litigants. And finally, I would like to refer to Katherine's 
discussion on cogent reasons: Would you think that maybe because now cogent reasons are 
formulated in a negative fashion - in the sense that the doctrine stipulates when we should not 
follow prior reports - maybe a positive formulation of this doctrine could help balance the two 
competing interests you referred to, namely that of consistency and that of not putting pressure 
to the Panel in a more effective manner? Thank you very much.            
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Other questions or comments? James? 
 
James Flett 
 
I thought all of the presentations were so brilliant, I couldn’t think of a question I wanted to ask. 
That is to say, I haven’t understood what the problem is, so well done. That is a great 
conclusion., I don’t think there is a problem. Unless somebody would like to tell me what the 
problem is supposed to be. Then I might have a question.    
 
(unknown speaker) 
 
Hello, my name is (…) from the Canadian Mission. I would like to invite views from the 
members of the panel with regard to some of the proposed solutions which are currently under 
the table with regard to the issues that we’ve been discussing that pertain to meetings between 
the members and the Appellate Body and also the idea of having the secretariat identify some of 
the concerns that have been voiced by the membership and the way that the Appellate Body has 
responded to it in its annual reports.  
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you and I saw another person who has a question. 
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Giorgio Sacerdoti  
 
Thank you. I wanted to add a comment on “cogent reasons”. I chaired that Appellate Body 
division which used that expression in its report. I think we have to recall that how the issue 
arose, Mexico was appellant and complained under Article 11 DSU that the Panel, by not having 
followed the case law on zeroing of the Appellate Body, had breached Article 11. And in that 
context, the Appellate Body said that Panels are expected for reasons of stability and 
predictability and respect of the expectations of the membership, to follow, previous case law, 
except for cogent reasons (without defining or listing them). The AB distinguished the authority 
of previously adopted AB report which is guidance for panels from General Council’s 
interpretations under Article IX (2) of the WTO Agreement which represent authentic 
interpretation. Accordingly while indicating that as a rule panels are expected to respect previous 
holdings of the AB, the AB rejected the claim of Mexico that article 11 DSU had been breached 
by the panel because of it not having followed the interpretation previously laid down by the AB. 
So, the AB did not elevate the principle to a legal obligation that in case of breach would 
represent a breach of the requirement to make an objective examination of the matter. This is 
very important because it underlines that the AB has not laid down “precedent” as a principle of 
WTO law in the sense of US common law, on the contrary. For instance, I read what the US said 
recently in a DSB meeting on this point. The US picked up this point but misunderstood the 
statement of the AB. The US considered that the AB had contradicted itself by stating that panels 
must follow the precedents of the AB while at the same time not finding a breach of Art. 11. 
What the AB did is just the contrary. Not having found a breach of Art. 11 by the panel because 
the panel had not followed the AB previous case law, and by restating that only interpretations by 
the membership under Art. IX.2 of the WTO Agreement are binding “erga omnes”, the AB has 
rejected any doctrine of precedent, while restating the importance of the principles of 
predictability and stability which underpins the conclusion that panels are expected to follow the 
previous interpretations of the AB, absent cogent reasons not to do so. Where do the words 
‘cogent reason’ come from? They were used by the appeal Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), which referred to the fact that the tribunal had not 
followed in the instance under consideration the case law of the Appeal Chamber. Referring to 
the approach of the ICTFY was appropriate because that is the only international tribunal which 
has an appellate mechanism. Thank to you all for a lively a productive session.   
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you, so I’ll ask the panelists to respond in the order of where you are sitting. Niall and 
then Robert, etc. please comment on or respond to the questions you like or offer other 
comments you may have.  
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
But on the question of this review mechanism, maybe for the other panelists or yourself Niall, 
one of the difficulties is how should the Appellate Body deal with recommendations of this 
reviewing committee (or from the DSB itself in its reviewing mode) commenting on the AB's 
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interpretations, conclusions and rulings? What should the AB do with the suggestions by this 
reviewing committee? Would the AB members be expected to discuss or refer to the conclusions 
or comments by this reviewing committee/DSB in their future report?  What’s the nature of this 
sort of mechanism? If this reviewing committee only states that the AB is asking too many 
questions, how is the AB expected to react or respond? Michael or Niall, how can the AB deal 
with that? Is it worth it?  
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Robert McDougall  
 
On the question of “guidelines” of the first questioner, there are two kinds of guidelines at play 
here. The first are the ones that are being discussed in the current negotiations, guidelines that are 
adopted, that are meant to be directed to the Appellate Body on how to interpret certain 
provisions of the DSU, covering things like the scope of the appeal and the mandate, and limiting 
obiter, etc. I know that’s useful and that’s likely the first thing that is going to come out of this 
discussion, but it is still left to the Appellate Body to figure out they mean. The risk is that its 
ultimately going to be interpreted and applied in a way that was not meant by the members that 
adopted them. My point in saying that it was insufficient was there needs to be more on the 
accountability side.  
 
The second element of “guidelines” is related to substance and this is what the question was 
getting at. This is where I think the solution is that the members themselves need to have a better 
mechanism. In that case, it would not necessarily be guidelines as much as it would be 
interpretation, authoritative interpretations. Those are not directed, at least not directly in the first 
instance, at the Appellate Body; they are directed towards the rules, the meaning of the rules, and 
that’s a better way to get at the question of how controversies, political controversies over the 
meaning of ambiguous rules, can be resolved. Not by trying to tinker on the edges of how you 
understand the meaning of the DSU when it comes to the Appellate Body pursuing its mandate. 
So the first set of guidelines might be helpful, but I don’t think they will be sufficient and 
certainly, as the US said in the General Council that they are not sufficient: it is not because we 
are going to add more words, that we are going to make it more likely that the Appellate Body is 
going to act in the way we, and hopefully others agree, expect of them.  
 
On the second point of the first questioner about “cogent reasons”: I agree with that last point 
(and I leave this to one of the other panelist to talk about what this is). Perhaps the burden is the 
wrong way on the “cogent reasons” standard. By saying that you have to demonstrate why it does 
not apply, it pushes a past report to the center of the argumentation rather than flipping it around 
and saying you have to demonstrate persuasively why previous reports need to be followed. 
That’s probably only a subtle change that is going to affect only the tone, maybe the order of the 
analysis in the report, but from the point of view of the procedural legitimacy among certain 
members, these kind of subtle changes of tone can make a difference to how at least some 
members react to the way reports seem to give authority to the Appellate Body, and the prior 
reports that it does not agree.   
 
On what is the problem with the dispute settlement system, I think the problem is not on the 
adjudicative side, the problem is on the legislative side. Both on having members decide on their 
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own, separately from what the Appellate Body does, on what the rules mean, advancing those 
discussions and in certain cases, over-ruling what the Appellate Body decided. That’s not a 
second level of appeal, that is a political override of a judicial outcome and that’s legitimate 
exercise, and that’s an exercise that happens routinely and effectively and helpfully in 
constitutional settings. It surprises me that we don’t recognize this as much as the problem here, 
as it would be recognized in domestic settings. There is not an obvious fix to that and the fact 
that we are only taking about meetings between the DSB and the AB reveals how hard that 
question actually is.  
 
Personally, I don’t think those meetings with the DSB are going to be of much use. They 
certainly might be ineffective for their stated purpose. They might even be inappropriate because 
it starts to mix the judicial and the political and blurs the borders between them. Ultimately, for 
practical purposes, they will be insufficient to resolve this particular crisis. The US is not going to 
consider them as sufficient level of accountability mechanism. They may be inappropriate 
because it tends to then -- and this might also be the reason why it may insufficient for the US -- 
elevate the Appellate Body to the equal of the DSB, and the only thing that’s missing is more 
information, more feedback from members and this is going to be a different format for it. I 
agree that the feedback the adjudicators currently get in the DSB are not representative or 
sufficient but there is no guarantee that this meeting with the Appellate Body is going to arrive at 
more representative feedback; it does not give the Appellate Body any mechanism to determine 
which part of what it hears is more appropriate. We can talk about “majoritarian activism”, 
whatever it is, but the mechanism itself is not going to make it any clearer what the Appellate 
Body should do. 
 
Philippe De Baere 
 
I think that many of the discussions on the interplay between the legislative and the judicial 
functions of the WTO were already addressed in the previous conference. Reflecting back on 
what was said then, I think that several solutions were proposed and I refer in particular to the 
possibility of introducing a process of legislatively remand in the Appellate Body system. This 
would mean that the Appellate Body can ask a question for an authoritative interpretation to the 
membership. We could also have a system whereby the Appellate Body issues its report but 
points out in its report where it considers that, for the future, further clarification would be 
welcome. This was an approach which was followed by the European Court of Justice in a 
number of instances and could work. In contrast, I don’t believe very much that informal 
meetings would be effective. At the most, it may help the Appellate Body members in identifying 
where certain lacunae exist or problems with legitimacy are being felt by the membership. As for 
precedent, when the Brazilian system was described, I was reminded of a theory we have in 
Europe where the European Court of Justice may actually say that a certain problem, a certain 
legal question that may be referred by a national court has in fact already been decided upon in 
the past and therefore constitutes an ‘acte éclairé’ so that no further judgment by or no reference 
to the European Court of Justice is necessary.  
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
If I may, isn’t there a fundamental difference in such review mechanism if it is done by a 
committee composed of WTO Members, including WTO Members - parties that won or lost the 
case? isn't it different if the mechanism was in the hand of third entities, other than the parties 
and the WTO Members?  Even if for many Members this proposal is not realistic at all, do you 
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have any view on this, Alana, do you want to answer this immediately and other comments you 
may have.  
 
Alana Lanza  
 
Thanks Gabrielle, yes I do. I do agree with Robert and my fellow panelists in that the interacting 
meeting with the DSB would be useful, but won’t be as effective. In my opinion, it is not the best 
way to address the problems that we face nowadays. That’s why in our view, we need a stronger 
approach and in of our proposals we suggest a possible external review in which members should 
contemplate introducing an external review and consider whether the Appellate Body has 
overstepped its mandate. We also suggest that a possible authority responsible for such review 
could be either the Director General or the Dispute Settlement Body itself or group of three 
chairpersons like we do in various selection processes, which could be the General Council Chair, 
Dispute Settlement Body chair and the TBRP chair. Or a small committee of the General 
Council or the DSB members. And obviously the possible consequences of the findings of this 
external review need to be considered by Members. We believe it’s a good way or at least a 
possible approach to consider in facing this problem. Thank you.      
 
Michael Hahn  
 
Thank you very much. I would like to take up the last remark of my learned colleague: a very 
important demarcation line will be: is the feed-back of the members binding or consultative? Is it 
technically a correction of previous DSB decisions – or, rather, just a very authoritative 
expression of opinion by the membership. If it is the latter, its super-important, it will be 
influential, as the Appellate Body would be ill-advised to not take its reasoning on board when 
the question arises another time. But it is of course a very different quality from actually having a 
decision which is binding upon the Appellate Body.  
 
Maybe this intermediate solution to have a very authoritative but non-binding clarification, is the 
way to go: It seems to me that such a feed-back by the Lords of the Treaties can be reconciled with 
the independence of the adjudicative organs. Similar cases before and after a Membership 
statement receive divergent treatment, but these are technical issues one could find solutions for.  
 
I wanted to make a remark with regard to accountability. Appellate Body members are engaged in 
conferences, workshops, so they do get a feedback of experts, of people they consider their peers 
or at least they consider as people who are able to make a legal argument. So, I think while it 
might be useful to install a mechanism of wise men and give their feed-back extra authority, it 
would not be a game changer for the current (and endangered) dispute settlement mechanism. If 
accountability means that the Appellate Body has to explain to the interested public or to the 
wider public what they have said and what they mean, I’m all for accountability. If one means by 
accountability that you have once per year – the week before Christmas or the week after 
Christmas – to visit your masters to get instructions, then that cannot be reconciled with an 
independent adjudicatory system. While such a departure from an independent third-party 
arbitral dispute settlement mechanism is in itself not the end of the world, it is far away from the 
current status quo; in my opinion, such a development would not in the best interest of 
membership. The main reason is the following: we pay a lot of attention to the big players, 
particular to the one member who has brought up this useful discussion on technicalities, but of 
course, there are around 160 other members out there which do not do belong to the category of 
economic superpowers. They expect that not only the big players are listened to, but subscribed 
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to a system in which they can expect equal treatment. That requires, in my opinion, a system in 
which justice is not only done but seems to be done and that requires independence. All 
proposals for reform should have the preservation of judicial independence in in mind. Thank 
you. 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Katherine? 
 
Katherine Connolly 
 
I just want to briefly touch on the idea of positive formulation of the cogent reasons standard 
because I think it’s an interesting idea and the way I see it working in practice would be that 
panels would effectively have an obligation to affirmatively state what their cogent reasons were 
for following particular Appellate Body jurisprudence and I think there are three kind of points 
to bear in mind from that. The first is the…I think it will have to be a selective obligation, you 
can’t have a standard of every instance in which the Panel wants to rely on the body of Appellate 
Body jurisprudence to affirmatively state the reasons why. It would depend on the extent of that 
obligation if they just need to say ‘we have cogent reasons for doing so’ versus actually reasoning 
those out, but I think there would have to be instances in which the Panels aren’t obliged to do 
that. The second is, as a matter of form, I agree that I think it could be helpful in that in a lot of 
ways the US has formulated its criticisms is that Panels are not performing an objective 
assessment of the matter before them and if you have even a lightly reasoned approach to 
explaining the cogent reasons for applying the jurisprudence, that is the performance of the 
Panel’s function to perform its objective assessment. So in that sense as a matter of process, it 
could be helpful, but, and I think this is the ultimate way we end up with this approach, as a 
matter of effect, I don’t think it will change Panel’s decisions, I think if the panels are minded to 
rule in one way or another, they are going to do so and this obligation would change the nature 
of the reasoning a little bit but to the extent that these concerns are about results and outcome, 
I’m not sure if they would necessarily address those concerns.   
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you, and I think another difficult issue that may come up is how to deal with past AB 
reports once, or if, the Appellate Body disappears.  Let's assume that Panels decide that they have 
to stop citing and quoting prior Appellate Body reports as such, and panels are ready to make 
their analysis of the relevant provisions based on the text and not on the prior AB rulings.  In my 
view panels could reach the same result without citing prior AB reports. But one difficulty is that 
the parties may very well continue to cite prior AB reports, if they believe that prior AB reports 
are to their favour, and the lawyers and the law firms may continue to cite prior AB reports – so 
how should future panels deal with such citations of prior AB reports if the AB does not exist 
anymore? It is not that simple. We have the time for another set of questions or comments from 
the floor, it’s close to lunch but if people had comments or questions, the panelists will let you 
have other things to say. Yes, James? 
 
James Flett 
 
I was really interested in Robert’s response. Actually, I think it is the first time I’ve heard you say, 
Robert, that the problem does not lie with the dispute settlement system. So, I’m really interested 
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to hear you say that. Wow! The problem does not lie with the dispute settlement system. That’s 
interesting and I agree.       
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Other comments or questions….yes, of course, go ahead. 
 
Michael Hahn  
 
I would like to make one remark with regards to Robert and the possibility to overrule Supreme 
Court decisions in domestic legal systems. What you describe is indeed desirable and that would 
be the optimum solution; however, many legal systems render the overruling of the respective 
Supreme Court de facto, impossible. In the US, for example, we haven’t seen a constitutional 
modification for ages due to the very high thresholds for doing so, and in many other countries 
the situation is similarly complicated: what is legally possible appears very difficult to achieve in 
practice. In such situations of de facto insulation from any immediate pushbacks, the respective 
High courts are well advised to show some humility and not overstay their welcome and 
overreach. The law does not show how to do that: the pertinent self-limitations follow mostly 
from cultural norms and political insights. Once overreach takes place or is perceived, a loss of 
confidence in the highest court of the land may ensue and destabilize the constitutional set-up. 
The Member currently attacking the Appellate Body experiences a loss of trust in its High court 
as a consequence of the openly partisan judicial appointments and decisions which make it easy 
to perceive the judges as facilitators of the political wishes of those appointing them. Thus, I 
concur with Robert’s insistence on the importance of political and extralegal elements.  
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you, I think…ah yes! The gentleman there, please. 
 
Christian Pauletto 
 
I would like to come back to the question by James as to "whether there is a problem or not" or 
"what the problem is supposed to be" and the link to the issue of cogent reasons. What if we put 
it in a different way, in the following very simple way? During a case, a party may always bring 
forward a precedent in its argumentation. Whenever a party does so, the party obviously needs to 
explain why it believes that precedent has to be followed. Then, all what the panel needs to do is 
to determine whether the explanations brought by that party are compelling, or not compelling. 
In any case, the party that invokes the precedent has the burden of proof, and this remains a 
burden of proving the positive. It’s not a big deal and sometimes I wonder if very technical 
problems are not made more acute just by the perspective and words you put on them. The 
bottom-line is to simply expect the adjudicator to explain his reasoning whatever the choice 
made. In that sense I agree with Bob [McDougall], and whether you call it negative or positive as 
some speakers did, you can go around this problem in a very elegant manner. 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Thank you. So, I think we’ll finish. Allow me…you wanted to say something…ah okay, go on. 
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Robert McDougall 
 
To come back to James’ comment, just to clarify: it’s not to say that there are not problems in the 
dispute settlement system, it’s that the problems in the dispute settlement system are caused by, 
and allowed by, the absence of an accountability mechanism. You can go all the way back to 
Ehlermann in 2002 when he said that you have to have “extraordinary circumspection” because of 
the absence of an ability of the political side to correct. This is another way of saying humility is 
required. Unless we can figure out how to improve that oversight, the Appellate Body, panels, the 
entire system on its own would gradually erode this idea that there are restraints because there is 
nothing you can do to bring it back. So it’s not that there aren’t problems on both sides, it’s just 
that the real problem is that we have no way in a consensus-based organization to make political 
decisions.  
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
Yes, Ricardo. 
 
Ricardo Ramirez 
 
Sorry, I could not resist. Just to react to Robert. Are you thinking of a system where you will 
engage in correcting each and every decision by the Appellate Body? So are you going to correct 
the public body interpretation? Other Members may be may also want to correct the amicus 
interpretation. There may be other members who might want to correct our interpretation of the 
protocol of Accession of China. So, is that really a solution? if you are going to correct each and 
every one of the decisions, there would be a long line of members who would want to correct 
our rulings. So, taking into consideration the consensus rule, how would you do it?   
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
You want to respond? 
 
Robert McDougall 
 
No, I don’t envision that… I don’t draw a straight line between every single report and then go 
for some political decision that tries to get in there and micro-manage the wording or micro-
manage the ruling. The US has proposed, and has been rightfully resisted over the years, that 
there be an ability on the part of the parties to delete parts of the report before it gets adopted. 
That would amount to giving more powerful parties the ability to tailor-make the jurisprudence. 
My point is slightly more removed from that…and relates to the second US proposal, which is 
partial adoption, where on consensus the membership could only partially adopt the report. So 
then you still have consensus and some parts that could be eliminated. That is also somewhat 
controversial.  
 
I would take it one step farther and say that once a report is adopted as is, there may be elements 
of the report that create a certain amount of concern. They could be subject to a follow-on 
discussion, maybe some mechanism where there is a right of petition for an authoritative 
interpretation that takes an excerpt from a report and goes through a time-limited process of 
discussion. This would replace the DSB-AB meeting because this is a discussion between the 
membership that says on this issue that we’ve highlighted as being a problematic area of 
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jurisprudence, you might be able to get an agreement that we want this corrected because it’s 
separate from the dispute. It’s not going to affect the report other than indirectly because it’s 
going to create an authoritative interpretation that would supersede the report, but it’s not going 
to interfere with the wording of the report or partially adopt or partially delete it. It’s going to be 
a mechanism that stimulates a debate that will be more representative, hopefully more 
representative than a DSB meeting, because there will be consequences, there will be an 
instrument on the books that will have a time-limited adoption date. Even if the rules of 
adoption are on consensus, 99% of the time it’s not going to get adopted, but the process itself 
will provide a more representative result of what members think than DSB statements. In the one 
or two or three or five percent of the times it actually gets adopted, then you’ve actually got 
proactive political decision-making that tailors the interpretation with some political 
accountability, and takes all the pressure off the Appellate Body to always get it right. 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
And we know that this "member control proposal" has been, sort of, refused by the membership, 
this proposal to some extent in the DSU review, for years. 
 
Robert McDougall 
 
The US proposals on partial adoption and partial deletion have been refused, but there’s never 
been a proposal that talks about how to revitalize the distinct right of authoritative 
interpretations, partly because the only time it has been tried, by the European Union, they 
abandoned it because, like I said, 99% of the time it is not going to get through. But we’re 
looking for ways to get political accountability, so we need to figure out how to do that better.    
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
I think you want to add, Philippe. 
 
Philippe De Baere 
 
Yes, I would like to add that I agree with what Robert has said. I would also like to come back to 
what Michael said about the use of the word ‘accountability’. We have to be very careful in using 
this term because it obviously can be seen as an attempt to interfere in the independence of the 
Appellate Body. Also, we should be aware of the risk described by Ricardo of a system whereby 
the Appellate Body members could somehow be censured for having said something or not 
having said something in their reports. This, in my view, would be unacceptable in light of the 
necessary independence of the judicial function. If we want to increase accountability, again, it 
has to be on the legislative level and a system of authoritative interpretations or calls for 
authoritative interpretation should allow the membership to correct what they perceive as 
erroneous interpretations.  I think this would be a more appropriate way of addressing the 
concerns with certain jurisprudence developed by the Appellate Body.   
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
So, if you allow me before we separate for lunch, my personal view again is that to some extent, 
the Appellate Body creation, the Appellate Body itself and the DSB/DSU automaticity is a 
miracle.  Yesterday, I was asked to talk to the LDCs who wanted to understand what to do in all 
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this debate and I repeated the same: the AB and the DSB reversed consensus are historical, 
something extraordinary. I said it at the previous WTI conference. A few years ago I did a 
research with young colleagues about whether and how often the Appellate Body reports are 
cited by other international tribunals. There is no other international tribunal or quasi-judicial 
body, however you label them, that are cited as often as the AB is cited. In 2012, it was 
over…reaching 150 times, so, there’s something there that we cannot deny: the world is looking 
and considering what the AB does and writes. Indeed, I entitled my paper "the AB: a Boat-Light 
in the international Fragmentation".  My goal with this panel was for us to understand that maybe 
the problem of the current crisis is not only or mainly with the Appellate Body, and to some 
extent it is a question of perception and background and about one's conception on the nature of 
the WTO dispute settlement system.  There is also a need for a reality check and it’s a political 
reality.  This is why the sessions of this afternoon are important. There’s an important player 
among WTO Members that says it has concerns – those concerns so far listed are procedural to 
some extent (although I don't like to limit the concerns expressed to their procedural nature), but 
in my view even the concerns of that Members are not limited to procedural issues and practices 
of the AB.  This player has also been complaining about the way the WTO dispute settlement 
system and the AB deal with trade remedies and this for almost twenty years. So then how do 
you deal with this reality, this is a problem, no? So, I’ll let you have a good lunch, and this 
afternoon hopefully a solution will be suggested. Thank you. 
 
xxxx 
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(…) (contribution removed) 
 
Jan Yves Rémy 
 
Thank you very much Joost, and thank you to the WTI for the invitation to sit on this very 
illustrious panel, especially having been outside of the fold for effectively a year, and I'm going to 
use my one minute to kind of provide a little bit of a perspective, I know Joost is running a very 
tight ship and getting us into the very technicalities of the issues, but I know I'm not going to 
have an opportunity to say this again, because of the people I'm surrounded by, literally, who I 
suspect will be using their jokers very generously. I do believe that there is a very important point 
here that needs to be raised, and it needs to be presented, and I had students here coming from 
the Caribbean after the first session this morning, and they said to me, "we don't hear our voice, 
we don't hear any perspective of ours being represented here." And it would literally be remiss of 
me to not say something about that, which is that, when you have the benefit of a little bit of a 
perspective, you know, hanging out in the Caribbean, the world of WTO dispute settlement and 
reform, in particular, takes on a very particular hue, which is one where it is very much a remix of 
the players of the system, and those who do not have their names fixed to any of the reform 
proposals currently banding around, where do their voices sort of get integrated into the process? 
And that's something that I want us to focus on just a little bit. As I see it, there are sort of three 
boxes of proposals currently on the table to deal with what has been dubbed the "AB Crisis". 
And I think there are amber box issues, there are red box issues, and there are green box issues. 
The amber box issues seek to try to get work-arounds. Deal with the issues that have been raised, 
and try to come up with some solutions to the immediate problems that have been voiced by 
some of the more influential parties and why we are here today, really, is to try and get past this 
"crisis". The second one really relating to the AB is, well, if this isn't working anymore, let's just 
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have a requiem, let's just call it quits, and let's just revert to panels and let's deal with the issues 
down there. And then the third sort of issues which I've realized are a little bit off the table now, 
is, let's fix the AB, let's keep it in its current iteration, but let's just work through it already, and I 
put that to the green box. Let's fix, let's try and fix what's already there. Let me just declare my 
bias that, in fact, none of these boxes really addresses the underlying issues for smaller states, or 
non-participating states, because, to the extent that the Appellate Body reform issues are on the 
table, they are symptomatic, and they have to be dealt with, but they certainly don't go to the 
underlying core issues that the Dispute Settlement Body negotiations for the last 20 years have 
been concerned with. Our concern is, from these regions, is, whilst the bigger players will haggle 
out the issues and try to seek the solutions to the immediate problems, the underlying 
participation and forcibility issues, access to the system issues, will not be addressed, and whilst 
this is an opportune time because the focus of everybody is on these issues of crisis, whilst this is 
an opportune time to put them on the table and try to get a wider sort of consensus to dealing 
with the issues, our concern is these little tweaks will be made to the system, but the underlying, 
fundamental issues of access will not be addressed. And so, let me just declare my hand 
immediately that, to the extent that we do have the limelight on these issues, that the rule of law 
is still very much the mast upon which the smaller participating Members want to affix their 
hands, and that at the end of the day, the rule of law should prevail and should be the correct 
prism, and I've heard other speakers say so, the correct prism through which the reform process 
should be engaged. And I have much more to say but I know Joost will get me back on target. 
So, to the precise question of what is the Appellate Body, what is the secretariat, what are persons 
who are very much integral to the system, what can they do? What are the self-help options 
available to them? And again, just to go back to my traffic light boxes, this I would say is one of 
the amber boxes. It's not a complete fix, but certainly it would serve as a work-around until the 
membership can actually engage on the deeper-seeded issues. So, the issue here that has been 
highlighted by Professor Steve Charnovitz, as one option, which is that the Appellate Body 
would effectively decide, through its Working Procedures, this is one option that has been 
canvassed, through its Working Procedures the Appellate Body would try to declare that this is a 
current state of emergency and that it cannot accept any new appeals. So, to the extent that an 
appeal is lodged with the Appellate Body Secretariat, there is no longer an existing Membership 
to decide the appeal, and so it won't accept them anymore, and then for purposes of the DSU 
Article 16.4, which only allows the adoption of panel reports once an appeal is completed, that 
for these purposes, you would then be able to carry through to the implementation stage because 
the completed language under Article 16.4 would have been addressed. Now, obviously there are 
some very fundamental problems I can see with that. The first one being that, well, part of the 
whole problem is the Appellate Body's speaking to fix problems itself. I don't see how the 
Membership generally would want this issue to be resolved by the Appellate Body deeming a 
report to be completed without it actually doing anything. And it's a more even fundamental 
question of how you square that sort of deeming completion language with what's in the text of 
16.4, completion obviously assumes that something has actually been done with the report, so I 
don't see that really as an option that is viable for the Appellate Body to do. Obviously, by 
December, I think the scope of the question is limited to what happens with new cases. 
Obviously, after December 10th I don't think there will be so much of an issue, because by virtue 
of Rule 15, you will have some cases still in the pipeline, but these would be cases that are already 
in existence and so I think the solution here is that the Appellate Body secretariat and 
Membership do not try to impose themselves in the process, because of the risk of inflating the 
issues even more. 
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(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Isabelle Van Damme 
 
I don't pretend to have the solution, but I should like to add to the points raised by Jan Yves. In 
our discussion this afternoon, it's important to distinguish between the availability of alternatives 
for appellate review, on the one hand, and the lack of compulsory jurisdiction, on the other hand. 
They are two separate elements, but because of the design of the system, they are intertwined. 
That distinction explains why it is important that Professor Van den Bossche has invited us to 
look at the solutions that WTO Members could encourage, and the solutions that could come 
from the WTO as an institution. In essence, the solutions that could come from the institution 
would preserve compulsory jurisdiction. All the other solutions require the consent of WTO 
Members, which means that we step away from compulsory jurisdiction.  Referring to 
compulsory jurisdiction, I mean that, by acceding to the WTO, a WTO Member has consented 
to adjudication without the need to consent again for each individual dispute. However, for all 
other types of WTO dispute resolution, ad hoc consent is additionally required. That's why it's 
necessary that we distinguish between solutions that can be put forward by the institution itself, 
and solutions initiated the WTO Members, because what's really at stake here is the concept of 
compulsory jurisdiction, which makes the WTO system so unique. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Leticia Ramirez Aguilar 
 
Thank you, Joost, and good evening everybody. I would like to thank the invitation by WTI, 
especially Professor Van den Bossche, it's a great honour to be sharing this panel with such well-
known and experienced personalities, it's a little bit intimidating, if I may say. Just before starting, 
I would like to frame that my interventions here, will be done in my own personal capacity. Let’s 
begin. How likely it is that Members will agree not to appeal? Well, every WTO Member has the 
right to appeal a panel report pursuant to the DSU, and these rights cannot be easily dropped. 
Members would always like to at least keep an option of appeal alive, which might not be the case 
if we are heading into December with no new AB Members on the list. Members or parties can 
make modifications to the DSU proceedings, through specific disputes, including modifications 
to wave or forego their right to appeal, the question of foregoing or having an agreement not to 
appeal, is on how to do it. This could be on a case-by-case basis, or it could be done as well I 
think as an agreement among parties. On a case-by-case basis, well, there is a strong incentive for 
respondents not to agree to forego or to agree on not to appeal, even in advance of the panel 
report issuance or after. What would be the particular circumstances here? We have an absence 
of a complete Division in the Appellate Body, so which would be the evaluations that Members 
could do? Well, maybe evaluate the substance of a measure, that a measure might not have a 
strong defence, and the Member might just need time to report back, or to convince back to 
capital or to their own authorities, to put the measures into compliance with WTO agreements, 
maybe there would be limited to cases where both Members may see an equal chance of winning 
at the panel stage. Sometimes a small budget not to pursue a long defence, including an appeal 
stage, or sometimes sensitive disputes where just a panel report might be enough. These would 
be some considerations, including, of course, a particularity of understanding the status quo where 
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we are. We have the examples, as you mentioned, of agreements among parties, before the 
issuance of a panel report. We have the example of Indonesia – Viet Nam and Chinese Taipei, 
that specifically addresses an agreement where, if the panel report is not circulated and the 
Appellate Body is composed of less than three Members, then the parties will not appeal under 
16.4 and 17 of the DSU. So, this is a very specific agreement, and an example of Members 
addressing or having alternatives not to appeal or an agreement not to appeal under these 
particular circumstances. Yet, we need to take a look on the particularities as well on this case. It's 
a 21.5 proceeding, and the party withdrew the measure presented before the panel report was 
issued. This is the only case that we have that addresses the particular situation and this is an 
example of Members discussing this. After the issuance, you raised as well, the case of Russia – 
Ukraine, but this is not an example of an agreement among parties or not one that we could see, 
in a written agreement, so this happened but it is not a reflection of the status quo, per se. What are 
the key elements for me, to agree not to appeal? Well, it's legally feasible, it doesn't need a DSU 
modification, but it needs political will. It's a negotiation, an agreement among parties, and maybe 
you would need equivalent interests to understand, again, the status quo. Nonetheless, there are 
opinions that say that a case-by-case renunciation could have a chance. 
 
The second is one more systemic or general approach: agreements as a group, or agreements 
based on reciprocity, which is different to a plurilateral agreement. This could be a potential way 
to neutralize the incentive of respondents not to agree to waive or to have access to an appeal. 
It's a systemic agreement, by a group of Members, that could be done through a single agreement 
that applies to all future disputes. So, this way, Members would have to weigh the pros and the 
cons, but in all future disputes where they could be claimants, or they could be respondents in 
any future disputes. There is no formal mechanism to do this, but it could be done on a group 
basis, on a Member-by-Member basis, and, as I mentioned, maybe as a principle of reciprocity, 
open or closed to future Members to join after. All these criteria will need to be considered by 
Members.  
 
To your following question: Are there other steps that Members (all or some) could take to 
address the possibility of the losing party of appealing into the void? Well, I can think of the 
alternative of arbitration under Article 25. This 25 arbitration is as well established under the 
DSU. It's another option under the WTO that could be agreed among parties to resolve a 
dispute. It could be from the beginning, or it could be a sub-part of an agreement not to appeal. 
I'm not entering into the details, yet this is, for me, another possibility, but there might be others. 
Finally: What happens if the exercising the right to appeal is maintained? Well, some panel 
reports might be adopted, and others will remain in the limbo or into the void as we have 
mentioned. The absence of a functioning Appellate Body will give some Members the ability to 
block the adoption of dispute settlement reports from the panel, yes. The question is, could this 
be not necessarily unreasonable or legitimate, and not just an intention to obstruct, but could 
then some disputes exceptionally have the motive to be legitimated to foresee an appeal and not 
wish to waive their right not to do so? And could these might be only isolated cases and not a 
regular basis? Well, this is a possibility of Members not wanting alternative solutions, and just 
having their alternative to appeal. It is also likely that some Members may accept an alternative 
solution for some disputes, but those cases where there may be involved too important issues to 
their respective interests, it might be difficult to waive their right to appeal as much as the system 
is in their own interest. So, I have more comments, but I'll stop here. Thank you. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
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Natalia Bayurova 
 
Thank you Joost, and thank you for inviting me to speak on this panel, and I'll be speaking 
primarily from my experience as a former diplomat, having worked for a Member who was quite 
active and is still quite active in the dispute settlement system, upon its accession, and I'm very 
happy to see some of my former colleagues in the audience and on the panel as well. And I really 
appreciate what Leticia highlighted about the examples that were picked up quite actively right 
after being released into the public domain, as examples of those rare and first agreements not to 
appeal, and, in particular, with the example that actually I think highlights the importance of 
treating these examples with care. And I'm thinking about if I were a diplomat in a mission, and I 
go to my Ambassador, and I say, "look, this is what these Members are doing." So if I say A, I 
have to say everything, all the letters in the alphabet, A to Z, to the extent that is available within 
my knowledge. So, I wouldn't like to decrease the importance of these examples. They are 
absolutely valuable, especially in this time, but, in any particular case, as Leticia mentioned, there 
can be different circumstances, and can we call a decision by two parties to a dispute not to 
appeal for their own reasons, that have very little or most likely nothing to do with the current 
crisis, an agreement not to file an appeal. Can we call that an agreement? So, I would just like to 
caution against maybe a not very careful use of such examples, and talking again about our 
experience, I wish we had a clear recipe once we head into these times, or a clear list of all the 
options. And I wish, if I were still working for my mission, at any given time or moment, I could 
come to my Ambassador or supervisor and tell him, precisely, what is happening right now in 
this house. What Members are doing, what different precedents we are having, what agreements, 
be they written or oral understandings between the parties, what the organization is doing, what 
are the proposals discussed at any given time, what is happening. But I'm afraid that probably no 
one will have that clear picture of everything that is going on, and things will develop as they go. 
So, it is very hard to overestimate the importance of these discussions and sharing the 
information that we have. And I would like to explore what you suggested, to look in the 
direction of, because now we are looking at different sources of potential solutions, or even 
sources of any potential help to all of us. We will have to live in this reality. And one of the 
potential directions are the panels, and again I'm speaking in my own capacity, in my experience I 
found both the panels and the secretariat to be extremely responsive to particular sensitivities, or 
the needs of the parties to the dispute. Here I would like to maybe take a step back and say that 
the panels do enjoy a certain degree of flexibility when adopting the procedures, and of course 
they do that upon consultation with the parties, but as we all know, panels have adopted different 
procedures that vary from the standard ones, irrespective of strong objections, at least by one of 
the parties to the dispute. And so they have this flexibility, but it's not unlimited. And I would 
like to take a look at the situations when two parties to a dispute, they don't have a possibility to 
appeal, either thanks to an agreement that they concluded before initiating the dispute, or due to 
other reasons. How this can affect, in a real case scenario, the procedures, the process, the air in 
the room, the way the parties will argue their cases, the arguments they will put forward, and I 
think that, my feeling is that it will also be happening as we go. Some commentators already put 
more focus on the panels, if we know that we're going to have just one shot at this, maybe the 
Members will be more careful in the panel composition process. Deciding on whom to put in 
these chairs. Maybe there will be a call to include more lawyers, but in that case, lawyers will have 
nobody else to blame for the result but themselves. So, some say that the panels will be more 
careful, doing what they're doing, or quite the opposite. So, that remains to be seen, how this will 
affect. But, I think that, having no opportunity to appeal, the parties, either directly or indirectly, 
will appeal to the panel. And one of the examples of potential use of flexibilities giving more 
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lenient, maybe, approach to some procedural requests from the parties, or in relation to timelines, 
one of the particular examples is the interim review stage. I would like to first of all say that, I 
would like to bring that example not as a per se positive usable feature of the system, but as a 
possible way to mitigate the burden on the parties that will enter into a non-appeal reality quite 
soon. And of course no interim review stage can replace, even partially, an appeal review because 
you're going to end up with the same people looking at these questions. But, I think that some 
degree of flexibility and help to the parties, they can come from here. And I don't know if I used 
up most of my time. Thank you. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
Thank you very much, I think I would just make three observations. The first one is, Leticia 
talked about case-by-case non-appeal, and I think I take what Natalia said about the limits of 
existing examples very seriously. I think case-by-case scenarios, especially in the middle of a case, 
are going to be challenging, at best. So, what that will simply result in, is a power play, in the 
middle of a case, between the parties. And whichever party has the stronger hand, politically and 
economically, is going to prevail on the question of appeal or non-appeal. Leticia mentioned 
collective agreements. I'd like to, as a footnote to that, and to pick up on Natalia's comments 
about flexibility, say that you could also have bilateral agreements. That is, a pre-appeal bilateral 
agreement on the basis of, for example, a statement in the DSB that any Member, not knowing if 
they're going to be on the defending side or the complaining side, where any other Member 
wants to enter into a bilateral agreement with us not to appeal cases so that panel reports could 
be adopted, we can enter into a bilateral agreement. Now, one of the positive aspects of a 
bilateral as opposed to collective agreements, as we know in this house, is that collective 
agreements require collective decision making, require negotiations, require proposals and 
counter-proposals and agreements and so on. And you end up with, again, another round of 
negotiations over process, as opposed to bilateral agreements where Members can sit down, in 
advance of any possible dispute between them, sit down and agree on things like panels. Panel 
composition, why not have a bigger number of panels? Why not, for example, seek the services 
of Ricardo and Giorgio and Peter, to serve on expanded panels? You could, in fact, 
reconceptualise and reimagine the interim review through bilateral agreements. Again, I wouldn't 
do this in the middle of a case, but you can see that there is a great deal of flexibility possible in 
the context of these bilateral agreements. I'll leave my comments on that, but just, I think it's 
important to bear in mind that a lot of the things that we think right now would be novel, were 
novel in 1995. Interim review was imported from the NAFTA, right? It is possible, at least, to 
reconceive of existing mechanisms because the times demand it. Thank you. 
 
Ricardo Ramirez 
 
Very brief. In just taking more, I mean, the options have been explored, but let me tell you my 
concern, and that goes to Victor’s point, that we need a political solution. The moment Members 
agree ex ante not to have an appeal, the moment the game is over. For me, the moment that you 
agree not to have an appeal, I understand that you may not want to appeal, for x and y reasons, 
on a case by case basis, which is very valid. But the moment you agree that you're not going to 
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have a second instance, the moment you waive that right, is the moment one of the WTO 
members at the table has won the game. And I will leave it at that. 
 
Alan Yanovich 
 
Thanks Joost, and thank you Peter and the WTI for the invitation. I'll make a few, short remarks. 
The first one is that, as we consider alternatives let's not forget the best alternative, which is to 
compose the Appellate Body fully. That has to be one of the alternatives we consider. I hope you 
haven't given up on it. I still think that is the best alternative. Now, James said earlier today that 
he doesn't see a problem in the record of the Appellate Body, I agree with him. I am not 
persuaded that there is a problem. That is not to say that we do not have a problem now. We 
have a huge problem. The blocking of the Appellate Body is a huge, pressing, and immediate 
problem that needs to be resolved. And to me, that should be the main focus of all discussions, 
rather than speculative alternatives. I see a lot of contradiction in some of the discussion. For 
instance, we're told by the United States that the Appellate Body doesn't work properly, and yet 
there are three appeals filed by the United States currently pending. So if the Appellate Body is 
that bad, why is the US appealing? I don't understand this, because if the Appellate Body has 
such a bad record, then I certainly would not be appealing those cases to the Appellate Body. So, 
to me, I'm still not convinced by the accusation that the Appellate Body has exceeded its 
mandate, and I'm not optimistic that a system in which there is no appeal would survive. To me, 
such a system would be quite unstable, and I see several problems. One is, panels are not 
infallible. We know that. The Appellate Body can make mistakes and the panel can make 
mistakes. We need a mechanism to correct that. What is going to be the mechanism when a 
Member doesn't like a panel report? The weaker Members will have to accept it. The stronger 
Members will probably not comply with it. That is what is going to happen in my view. There will 
be contradictions between panels. That is going to happen. To me, uniformity is a value. 
Uniformity was a value for the United States as well when the DSU was created. If you look at 
the U.S. Statement of Administrative Action for the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, it says that 
“Article 17 creates another new procedure, appellate review of panel decisions, which should help 
ensure uniform interpretation of Uruguay Round Agreements”.  This was a value that Members sought to 
reflect in the DSU through the Appellate Body, including the United States. Losing that, to me, 
will be problematic. But, to me, the main problem is the right to appeal exists today in the treaty. 
It is a right of all other Members. To take away that right is to take away a concession of the 
other Members, and it is to take away a concession without giving anything in exchange. I 
wouldn't accept that. But, more importantly, my concern is, if we accept that with respect to the 
Appellate Body, who is to say we're not going to be asked for the same thing with respect to 
something else? Who is to say that, in the future, when panels start giving unfavourable rulings 
against a particular Member, that Member will say, well, I don't like panels anymore. Or I don't 
want panels to be issuing decisions on agricultural subsidies. Let's take out agricultural subsidies 
from compulsory jurisdiction. Who is to say that's not going to happen? And, to me, that is the 
question that I would pose. I mean, the United States has been good at asking questions about 
other Members, but I think the question I would pose, if I were a Member, to the United States 
would be that, what is it that would guarantee that the United States would respect panel reports 
in the future and would implement those reports fully? How do we know that's going to happen? 
I certainly don't know. And the example of the Appellate Body, to me, suggests that it won't 
happen, if those findings are unfavourable. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
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(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
Well, I think, and I'm going to be very brief on this one, because Alan set out the central 
argument about this whole thing when he talked about each Member having a right to appeal. So, 
once you start from that perspective, whether or not there is a functioning Appellate Body, if you 
have a right to appeal, you will exercise that right, and if it means that that will force the panel 
reports into limbo until such time as the Appellate Body is structured, well, so be it. But that is 
precisely why, as Nic pointed out, why we need to think about alternatives. I don't think there is 
going to be an allegation of bad faith, because that is a right and, to the extent that the 
organization isn't functioning, well, it's not functioning.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Alan Yanovich 
 
To me, the main problem is to the extent there is any way of choosing whether you implement or 
you do not implement, before the appeal, the advantage will be with those who are more 
powerful. That to me is clear. I don't see how it would work any other way. Now, as I said 
before, the appeal is an integral part of the DSU as it was agreed by Members during the Uruguay 
Round. It's an integral part of the package. It is as much part of the package as any of the other 
disciplines. It's as much part of the package as the prohibition on export subsidies. It's as much 
part of the package as the disciplines in the TRIPS Agreement. Why is it that we can be selective 
about this, and not about the other obligations? I have trouble understanding that. They're both 
international obligations, they're part of the same international treaty, but somehow we've come 
to a point in the discussion where we think this obligation is optional and all the others are 
mandatory. I don't see that. It's the same treaty, and if you don't trust another Member, or 
another partner, to comply with one obligation, on what basis are you going to trust them to 
comply with the rest of the obligations? I just don't see it.  
 
 
(…) (contributions removed) 
 
 
James Flett 
 
So, could the panellists please say something about the idea of alternatives through the lens of the 
MFN principle, at least by analogy or from a more political perspective? Whatever the alternative 
might be, whether it's a non-appeal agreement, or an Article 25 DSU agreement, if one Member 
agrees with another Member that they will allow access to an appellate level through Article 25 
DSU, do they have to extend that to anyone else who is interested in playing? Because of the 
MFN principle? And is that interesting because, would that suggest the possibility of a rapid 
process by which Members would coalesce around, ultimately, an interim solution? And, 
relatedly, is it possible for the two alternatives to coexist? Can you have non-appeal agreements 
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and Article 25 DSU agreements, in light of the MFN principle, or ultimately would a Member 
have to choose in which camp it wished to live? And if it chose to live in the Article 25 DSU 
camp, would it have to do that with all of its potential litigants?  
 
And finally, isn't there an incredibly important audience that needs to be reached and 
communicated with, which is, investors? Global investors. Isn't it the case that global investors 
need to know which Members still believe in binding and mandatory dispute settlement and 
security and predictability, because you need to get the money in play? Will investors not be 
highly inclined to invest in those Members who still believe that value chains need to be 
protected by enforcing WTO obligations, and be much less inclined to invest in a Member that 
chooses to be an outlaw? And doesn't the money ultimately drive the process? So we need to 
communicate that. We need to be transparent. All those Members who are agreeing to this kind 
of alternative arrangement, they have a huge interest in communicating that to the market, to 
investors. 
 
 
(…) (contributions removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
Look, I think we, let's take a step back. We've heard a lot about the right of appeal and so on, and 
it's important, obviously, in the context of the scheme of the DSU. And I'll have a couple of 
things to say about that when we talk about Article 25. But, here's a, in the presence of former 
Appellate Body Members, in front of one of whom I've actually argued, two of them, actually, let 
me posit the following: we heard about, earlier, about compulsory jurisdiction. And we've heard 
about negative consensus here and there. The central benefit, the revolutionary aspect of the 
WTO, was, in fact, compulsory jurisdiction and negative consensus. Bear in mind, go back to 
1947-48, the ITO died on that issue. And so, the Appellate Body - now there is in Canada the 
lore that it was a Canadian proposal, whether or not that's the case, at any rate - the Appellate 
Body was a response, was an attempt, at addressing the problems of panels that parties had 
experienced under the GATT. But the real revolution that basically started with 1989 and then 
the ink dried on it in 1994-95, was compulsory jurisdiction and negative consensus. And my own 
sense of it is that those are values that we can right now maintain, even if, for a period, whether it 
be a few years or a few months, the Appellate Body is not functioning. And that, to me, is one of 
the key issues that we need to bear in mind as we reflect on reform. On what these next steps are, 
and so on. The second point, James is really good at identifying, in almost, and I don't mean this 
as an insult, but take it as you will, but in almost Jesuitical precision, with surgical legal precision, 
issues that may arise. Legal issues that may arise if we follow one path rather than the other. And 
the MFN argument is another one of those. Now, it is, I'm sure… 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
No, this is about James' point. 
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(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
No, it's about the non-appeal agreements. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
No, it's about a non-appeal agreement. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
No, but it has to do with whether a non-appeal agreement will result in an MFN concern, and I 
mean, it is possible that you could somehow shoehorn a diplomatic agreement between two 
Members into Article I and Article III as measures somehow affecting the internal sale of like 
products, but I mean who would want to do that? Members that would enter into a non-appeal 
agreement are trying to save the organization. And by raising, anybody who would raise a 
challenge to that and launch a case against that other Member for inclusion in a non-appeal 
agreement that it hasn't negotiated, would basically result in the collapse of the regime. I just want 
to know which country would want to do that.  
 
 
(…) (contributions removed) 
 
 
Michael Hahn 
 
Thank you very much Joost. Just two very quick questions. Firstly: if it is correct that compulsory 
jurisdiction and negative consensus is to be preserved, why, then, is it not being discussed 
currently, whether that could or should be achieved through a decision by the Membership – be 
it through an authoritative interpretation or a waiver – that appeals are only possible to a working 
Appellate Body. Could you share your views on the lack of that discussion? My second question 
is addressed to the panel: Why is it that you seem to be confident that appealing without a 
working Appellate Body in place is not an abuse of rights? And why is it that you think that a 
winning party, which then requests a panel report to be considered at the next DSB meeting, 
would have no chance of getting actually a DSB decision based on the panel despite the pending 
appeal, given that there is the possibility of abuse. Thank you very much. 
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(…) (contributions removed) 
 
 
(unknown speaker)  
 
This is approaching the bias of the Chinese Taipei mission to the WTO. Because of the non-
appeal clause between Indonesia and Viet Nam has been mentioned several times by the 
panellists, so I think I should say something. Of course I cannot go much into the detail. I think, 
I just want to highlight one fact. That is, in this case, Indonesia terminated the measure in 
question. At the end of the RPT. And the second agreements were agreed, were negotiated and 
created and circulated around the same time. So I just want to highlight these facts so, if anybody 
wants to make the argument, so or to make any arguments based on these cases, I hope that we 
can take a look at these facts. So, actually this non-appeal clause does not serve any actual 
functions because actually, the three parties agree that the responding party complied with the 
DSB ruling. And turning to the third scenario, I do not think that this a very reasonable 
expectation that we can say Members will use self-restraint not to appeal, because we have 
established that each appeal is not just relevant to legal arguments. It's relevant to real money. 
There are hundreds of companies over there, billions of dollars there, so a losing party, I think 
they will always be a political pressure for a losing party to find a way to remedy a losing case. So, 
that is what I wanted to say. Thank you. 
 
 
(…) (contributions removed) 
 
(session paused for tea break) (session resumed) 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Thanks very much Nic and Joost and good afternoon.  
 
I was quiet up to now but I just kept my powder dry.  
 
Now on the political landscape of things, it's important to recall where we are and Peter already 
mentioned it briefly in his presentation at the beginning of the conference, that we currently 
focus on unblocking the appointment procedures. Members are doing this by putting forward 
proposals to address the known US concerns and that is the process now led by Ambassador 
Walker. That is a very important process and that process, in our view, needs to continue, 
because, as Jan said, the best option to move out of this impasse is to reinstate the Appellate 
Body. To unblock the appointments, that stays our prime objective, continues to be our prime 
objective and the European Union continues to be highly invested in that process. Now, this 
being said, and while they are continuing to be invested in this process, it is only natural that 
WTO Members look into scenarios of what will happen if certain events do not occur. That's 
only sound administration. And that also includes the European Union, and so therefore the 
reporting in the media of this week shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone. What we are doing in 
looking at scenarios how to deal with our own cases, how to protect our own legal interests in 
particular proceedings and how to protect them, we call it the interim solution. So it's a solution 
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to deal with particular problems, in particular cases, in a way which allows us to deal with the 
situation when the Appellate Body is defunct, until the Appellate Body rises again. So this is why 
we call this interim solution, it's not plan B, we don't like this name at all, it sounds too definitive, 
too broad, too complex, it's the interim solution that we are looking at.  
 
Now, in doing that, you looked at various concepts and Article 25 appeal arbitration is by far the 
least unattractive option. All other options are vastly more unattractive, including the new appeal 
option because, the feature of a no appeal option is that there is no appeal, to put it bluntly. So 
we don't have quality control of Panel Reports and we don't have coherence which is being 
assured by the second instance. Now, we would want to be able to point to these features when 
we have to explain to our citizens the results of adjudication of highly sensitive issues in the 
WTO, and where we have to explain to our economic operators about the results of WTO cases 
when billions of Euros of trade are at stake. So it is extremely important for us to keep that 
feature of dispute settlement two stage process. This is in fact one of our three red lines that we 
have when we look at these scenarios, but also when we look at the proposals on unblocking the 
appointments. It's very simple – three red lines:  two stage process, independence of the 
adjudicators, and binding dispute settlement. And if we look at those three red lines, Article 25 
appeal arbitration squarely fits the bill.  
 
Now we'll go into more detail on how Article 25 appeal arbitration would work now with Nic, 
but there are three types of vehicles that we would be in theory looking at, when implementing 
Article 25 Appeal Arbitration. The first one would be a horizontal solution, where we would have 
a number of WTO Members signing up to an arrangement where they agree that in their disputes 
they will resort to that mechanism. The second category would be a reciprocal approach. We 
have two WTO Members who agree that in pending and future disputes, they would resort to 
that mechanism, a bilateral, reciprocal arrangement in all the disputes that they have with each 
other. And the third category would be an ad hoc agreement in a particular case. And because of 
this general political landscape, for the European Union, the focus is now on the last two 
categories. Either reciprocal approach or an ad hoc approach to appeal arbitration. Over to you 
Nic. 
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Yes, perhaps to start with the question for which cases would this appeal arbitration be available. 
And here we have two temporal dimensions. The first one would be that it should only be 
available for cases when the Appellate Body cannot hear the appeal to that case. So we would not 
want to build here an alternative system to the Appellate Body but it is something which is there 
for the interim when the Appellate Body is not able to hear appeals.  
 
The second temporal element would be that, Members should only agree to this application of 
the system to a particular case if the interim panel report has not yet been issued in that dispute. 
And the simple reason for that is, is that we want to avoid to put Members in the impossible 
position to decide what is more important. The particular litigation tactical decisions for whether 
it is actually a good idea to have an appeal, yes or no? And possible systemic reasons for agreeing 
to it. So it would only be available for cases where the interim report has not yet been issued.  
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Now, to a brief description of the process, how we would see it on the basis of an actual case, 
where this system would apply, you will have regular consultations, panel proceedings, parties 
would decide early on in the panel proceedings, let's say 60 days after panel establishment, to 
actually file the arbitration agreement for that particular case. That arbitration agreement would 
then set out all the various steps that would now follow.  
 
The first step that would happen is that the working procedures for the panel would be amended 
as necessary and that would include for the next step, that let's say 45 days before the expected 
circulation of the final report, the panel would give notice to the parties that this is coming up. 
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval)) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
So that happens, the panel proceedings are suspended, and on the basis of the notice of appeal, 
the appeal arbitration would start. Now in practice, the notice of appeal would have attached the 
panel report in all WTO languages and the notice of appeal would be sent to the WTO 
Secretariat. One could then imagine that this notice of appeal with the panel report is then 
published on the WTO website. So we have full transparency with regards to that particular step. 
After this notice is being sent to the WTO Secretariat and is being published, the appeal 
arbitration would start with the selection of the arbitrators and we'll come to that particular point 
a little bit later when we focus more on procedural issues. Also third parties, and it is the third 
parties that have been part to the panel proceedings, would be able to participate in the appeal 
arbitration, and then after the appointment of the arbitrators, the appeal arbitration would be 
followed through exactly mutatis mutandis as is currently happening in an appeal.  
 
At the end of the arbitration, the appeal arbitration award would be circulated, it would contain 
the findings and possible recommendations of the appeal arbitrator on the appealed findings, and 
would also contain as an attachment the panel report, which would therefore incorporate the 
non-appealed unmodified findings of the panel. So you basically have the entire package moved 
from the panel phase into the arbitration phase.  
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
So, we can now move to some more specific institutional and procedural issues that we want to 
focus on and that would be the selection of arbitrators, exchange of views, and participation of 
third parties.  
 
On selection of arbitrators, here we are dealing with arbitration, so it is useful to have a roster of 
arbitrators. That roster would be comprised of available former Appellate Body Members. This is 
the idea that we have. With that, we would ensure that the arbitration is staffed with individuals 
of the highest quality. The selection from the roster to a particular appeal arbitration and here 
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again, the arbitrator would be comprised of three individuals, would happen like it is currently 
being applied in the selection of Members of the Appellate Body for a particular division hearing 
an appeal. So it would be random and it would be done in the same way that it is currently being 
done by the Appellate Body Secretariat. Now the difference here is that we see that for 
institutional reasons this would require that the Director-General of the WTO would need to 
formally appoint the arbitrators for this particular appeal arbitration because the this is what 
Article 25 says.  
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Yes, as Nic has foreshadowed, I beg to disagree on this point, we think that for two main reasons 
it would not be appropriate to have an exchange of views for appeal arbitration. The first one 
would be that there is the important practical difficulties in actually ensuring that an exchange of 
views can happen in practical terms if you have a roster of individuals which is a different 
situation than if you have seven individuals being put in the particular institution. Second, there 
are certain confidentiality requirements which you have when it comes to the arbitration for a 
particular case. And that issue would need to be addressed if you really wanted to allow exchange 
of views and we find this quite difficult and cumbersome.  
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Yes, and here I agree fully with Nic, and this ends our presentation.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
For the purpose of our discussion also, in the coming weeks, can we agree on a terminology that 
the horizontal approach - so several Members sign up to the system, then there is the reciprocal 
approach - the bilateral arrangement for current and future respective disputes against each other, 
and the ad hoc approach - for individual cases.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
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Jan Yves Rémy 
 
Very quickly, if I may, so, just go back a little bit to the solutions on the table, the options on the 
table, again, looking at this as a tangible workable sort of work around in the interim, I think 
when I first made my intervention, it's all premised on what do those who are not big players in 
the system, through which prism do they appraise the options on the table, and I'm happy to say, 
being one of the authors of the proposal in the first place, that it aligns with that interest, it aligns 
with that interest why? Because I think as Martin outlined, the Article 25 process as conceived 
would retain the two stage review, it would ensure independence and safeguard the independence 
and it would be binding. The one thing, which again, from the perspective of those who are not 
constantly as in the system, are the hallmarks of the system, which make it a viable dispute 
settlement system for those who are less powerful and not able to engage in the power play. So 
we're good with that. 
 
I wonder however, whether the current proponents of the proposal wouldn't consider using the 
solution as an opportunity in a sense to test some of the discussions and the reform orientated 
proposals that are on the table. So, what do I mean? Or even to use it as a way of legitimating 
and legitimising bringing in more features of the rule of law. What do I mean? I mean one of the 
issues that has come up is access to the system and participation in the system by more. More 
Members, the Appellate Body Members, so the solution of retaining the old Appellate Body 
Members or using them for a roster, could we envisage maybe widening the number of 
arbitrators to not just those, and with all respect to the former Appellate Body Members, of 
whom I have the greatest respect, wouldn't this be a way of maybe choosing not Appellate Body, 
non-Appellate Body Members, but persons of recognised authority in the field of international 
trade that may hail from different regions, very differential geographical scopes that under the 
current appointment procedure have very little chance of actually being part of the system 
because of the occupation of seats on the Appellate Body, so we could think of using that as an 
opportunity to legitimise the process by having more Appellate Body Members or more 
arbitrators from different regions.  
 
The second one would be to think about third participants who may not have been parties at the 
panel stage but may have acquired an interest in the system and would they maybe be allowed 
also to sit in on the arbitration appeals option. And then more to the softer issues that are being 
discussed currently, like, could we, through this process, allow for a certain types of approaches 
to the 90 day rule? So for instance, you inscribe into the agreement that appeals shall last for 90 
days and no longer or you work in the municipal law as a matter of fact as opposed to a matter of 
law. So, some of the things that are actually gaining ground in terms of building a consensus 
amongst some of the persons putting forward proposals for reform, or ways that we could 
address the concerns of some of the bigger players, we could use this as an opportunity to test 
their viabilities so that when this work around is no longer needed, that you could actually see if 
they had any chance of success and then they could be then built into the new Appellate Body, 
once the immediacy of the problem is resolved.  
 
Thank you.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
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Natalia Bayurova  
 
Just maybe a short question. I'm just very curious to know what Nic and Martin [Lukas] would 
like to say about any tendency or danger of this interim solution becoming a permanent one, if 
there is anything that can be done in that respect, except for our good will to rely [inaudible]. 
Thank you.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Leticia Ramirez Aguilar 
 
Thank you Joost, I have some brief comments on this idea and maybe it will serve as a closing, as 
I know we still have more panellists to come. This exercise is very important as Members will 
need to start looking for alternatives to have a possible DSM working in the WTO, and for that it 
would be important to understand where we are and the status quo we are facing. This does not 
mean that we don't want as a primary option to have a complete Appellate Body as some have 
mentioned, but as well we would need to think on other possibilities, therefore it might be worth 
to take a look at this option of Article 25, as an alternative for sure, but as Natalia mentioned, I 
think it needs to be temporary and we need to be careful that this does not build into a 
permanent solution that could be stabled for more than we want to. And, as well, we need to 
think if is it viable to all Members and for all disputes, so we need to have an entire picture of the 
alternative, and think about it, but of course, this exercise is very useful for Members to start 
thinking from here on what would be needed. Maybe we will be learning throughout the path.   
Thank you. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
I just want to add two or three questions and comments. First, am I correct that the original 
panel report would never be circulated before the Appellate Body Report? Because for a 
document to be circulated it needs to be translated into the other two official languages, and only 
after translation, under the2002 Derestriction decision, will it have a symbol.  Then once 
circulated a panel report needs to be adopted unless it is appealed (or reversed by consensus) – 
you will want to avoid this if you want to avoid an appeal in the void. Therefore, your process 
will need to stop this automaticity. And I'm not sure that the parties alone can stop it, you will 
need to protect the rights of third parties and the institutional rights of WTO Members.  
 
Second, Arbitration reports are usually not adopted by the DSB, they are only on the agenda and 
then would the DSB somehow "take note" of the Arbitration Appeal report and its annexed 
panel report?  But what about the conclusions and recommendations of the panel report that are 
not appealed to the Arbitration Appeal process? In the DSB you'll need to have both sets of 
panel report's conclusions - the appealed conclusions and the not-appealed panel 
conclusions/recommendations - noted by the DSB, I think.  
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Third, if you have an informal exchange of view between 7 arbitrators, if you add more people 
than the three arbitrators, isn't there a risk of breaching confidentiality?  Such three Arbitrators 
would be bound by the WTO Rules of Conduct that include confidentiality rules. 
 
Fourth, on the issue of using only Appellate Body Members as arbitrators. Are you sure you have 
enough people?  
 
And to finish, there's an issue of who would be serving or assisting those arbitrators? Who would 
be in the Secretariat serving this?  
 
These are just random comments.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
(unknown speaker) 
 
Well, thanks for the intro Mr Pauwelyn. Can you hear me? No? Yes? Ok, thank you.  
Yes, I'm [Inaudible]. I'm a delegate for dispute settlement at the Peruvian Mission. I think most 
of the comments I wanted to make have already [been made], but just to underscore where 
would be the function of the Appellate Body Secretariat in both of the [proponents'] mind, I 
mean, would it be kept, to what extent, you know, to what extent would there be modifications? I 
noticed that in the paper that's in behind there's reference of course that the parties would likely 
compose the roster in consultation with the Appellate Body Secretariat to ensure the availability 
of the individuals and the representatives of the roster, so, what exactly does that mean and in 
what order parts of the proceedings would Appellate Body Secretariat have been, particularly 
taking into account the reports are not written by themselves, so, that's the question that I want 
to make. 
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
James Flett 
 
Congratulations, I think it's a great idea, I don't think that's a big surprise. 
  
Jan Yves, I am not sure that it's a great idea for everybody to come with their shopping list of 
improvements because it will get stuck. I think I agree with the proposition that the principle that 
should guide this entire exercise is that it should be absolutely as simple as possible, as absolutely 
as close as possible to the existing arrangements, and only depart from the existing arrangements 
to the extent that is absolutely necessary from an operational point of view to get to the place 
that you need to get to. But I don't think that it should be an opportunity for everybody to come 
with their particular theories about DSU review, because I think that would drag it down, so, I 
would beg you, please not to do that.  
 
On permanence, we did have fifty years of the provisional application of the GATT. I'm not 
suggesting we should have fifty years of the provisional application of the interim solution under 
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Article 25, but, at the end of the day, as Members, and this was the point that Viktor was making 
earlier, the WTO is a win-win and by extension litigation is actually a win-win. Those Members 
who believe in security and predictability, I made this point before, have an ace in their hand 
when it comes to explaining to investors why they should invest on their territory, because the 
investment and the value chain is secure, because we are dealing with law abiding rules-based 
Members, and that is something that can be communicated, that is something that can be sold. 
And ultimately, there is a price for those who are not part of that system, which perhaps 
ultimately might persuade them to reconsider the calculus of their own interests.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Gabrielle Marceau 
 
What are the views of others on the financing and administrative arrangements for this new 
arbitration Appeal process?  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Rambod Behboodi 
 
There are a number of systemic issues that arise as a result of going offline to a separate 
Appellate Body, to a separate appellate instance.  
 
To start with, we heard about the roster, we heard about former Appellate Body Members, and 
then Jan Yves raised a very serious concern about, well, if you are starting a whole new system, 
should we not actually pay attention to the excluded countries, and of course, you know, we had 
the other perspective, oh don't come in with your other issues, let's just like, let's deal with the bit 
that we can have and then, you know, we'll take care of your concerns later on. But the problem 
of Appellate Body selection, as we have seen, is a critical problem.  
 
Now, when you have Appellate Body members selected by the Membership, you've got 
legitimacy. When you have a roster appointed by who knows, you know, the first session, ok, we 
have, we draw from the former Appellate Body Members, but what about the rest? Where do 
they get their legitimacy? It would be, you're talking about basically ad hoc appointments, 
potentially, or potentially some people on the roster who may or may not have any demonstrated 
or necessary adherence to the system itself. We heard about continuity and coherence. Continuity 
and coherence are functions of the permanence of the body and when you have ad hoc Article 25 
appeals, you don't have that, you don't have that permanence.  
 
Now, you could say well, what about the roster? Well then we then come back to the question of 
the legitimacy of selection. Gabrielle raised the issue of “confidentiality” with respect to 
collegiality. Gabrielle also raised the issue of “noted” - when you have Article 25 decisions, they 
are binding on the Members just like other Panel reports, but they are only “noted” and not 
adopted by the DSB. That - adoption by the DSB - if it doesn't mean anything, ok, that's one 
thing, but it should, and in fact we know from the early cases of the Appellate Body, that the 
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Appellate Body itself, in the Japan Alcohol case, said that it makes a difference when you have a 
report adopted. So you have the bizarre scenario of a panel report that will be adopted by the 
DSB, because at some point it has to be, whereas there's the Article 25 arbitration reversing an 
adopted panel report that will be “noted” by the DSB and then enforced through the DSB.  
 
From an institution-building perspective, this creates a crisis of legitimacy inside the Organization 
itself. The Appellate Body has referred to the hierarchical nature of the structure of Dispute 
Settlement, and ok, fine, we don't have that, we're creating a hierarchy, Members are entitled to 
create that hierarchy. But that hierarchy, again, is not part of the, that hierarchy created by some 
Members through Article 25 appeals, that hierarchical structure is not part of the scheme of the 
DSU. Members can, between themselves, arrange themselves to create that, but I think for 
future, that is - this is on the question of the legitimacy of decisions and the receptibility of 
decisions of - for future cases, you will have that hierarchical issue come up.  
 
And finally, I think the, unless you've got a plurilateral agreement, the non-automaticity of these 
sorts of appeals, whether they're ad hoc or bilateral causes concern because they reintroduce yet 
again power dynamics. And I think we need to be aware of that. There's nothing wrong - we've 
got a system that necessarily runs a bit on power dynamics – but I think the challenge is, if we say 
that we want a second instance in order to fix the problems of the first instance, if there are any, 
we should not inject additional power dynamic problems into the regime by having a system that 
runs on ad hoc appeals or that runs on bilateral appeals.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Yes, well, we'll try. Thanks very much for these questions and comments.  
 
On Jan Yves question on, you know, the ideas to widen the roster to have certain improvements 
implemented, I agree with James that we have to be careful not to overload the boat here. What 
we're trying to achieve here is an interim solution to a serious problem and we feel that this 
would make things overly complicated.  
 
Now, many of the ideas that you have mentioned are in fact proposals that the EU has put 
forward in 753 for example, but we have to be focused, we think, in looking and designing this 
interim solution. Definitely Natalia, we have to be careful that this is not being considered as 
something permanent. Now the documents that we envisage, the reciprocal one or the ad hoc 
one, they will have health warnings all over the place that this is only interim, that this is not 
happening when the Appellate Body is able to hear an appeal and will not be available anymore 
when the Appellate Body is able to hear appeals. A technical footnote here, we would foresee, 
however, that appeal arbitrations which are ongoing when the Appellate Body can continue to 
hear appeals again would stay within the appeal arbitration track.  
 
On the question of circulation and translations, Gabrielle's question, now the arbitration 
agreement would explicitly say that the parties confirm that this is not the intention that the panel 
report be circulated within the meaning of Article 16 of the DSU, so this is being catered for, but 
the panel report needs to be transmitted somehow to parties and third parties and eventually also 
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to the WTO Secretariat for technical reasons to allow the appeal arbitration to commence in 
orderly fashion.  
 
Now who will pay? Well, there will be at least two WTO Members who will ask the WTO 
Secretariat to service this appeal arbitration, arbitration which is seen under Article 25 of the 
DSU, so we have the right that this is being serviced properly as this is done for Article 21.3.c 
arbitrations when former Appellate Body Members are assisted by the Appellate Body Secretariat.  
And with that, I'd like to hand over to Nic please. 
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Thank you Nic. Yes, one last question from Gabrielle. Do we have the numbers? Are there 
enough former Appellate Body Members willing to … 
 
 
(…) (awaiting text approval) 
 
 
Martin Lukas 
 
Well, we hope so, we think so, this is the indication that we have. Of course, this would need to 
be ascertained by the Appellate Body Secretariat I suppose, but we are honoured by the presence 
of four former Appellate Body Members. I think this is already a good sign.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Ricardo Ramirez 
 
No, no, you start.  
 
 
Isabelle Van Damme 
 
Thank you Mr Chair. I might need more than a minute.  
 
I would like to start with three remarks on questions that have been raised but were not yet 
addressed by the panel. First, on the issue of multilateralizing a no appeal agreement or an Article 
25 agreement, under WTO law, there is no umbrella clause similar to what we find in certain 
investment agreements. I don't think that such an agreement would be a measure that falls within 
the scope of, for example, Article 1 of the GATT.  
 
Second, Michael mentioned that we all assume that everyone is on board with compulsory 
jurisdiction. I put a question mark next to that assumption because it seems to me that the 
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current government of at least one WTO Member wants control over the outcome of the 
process in terms of possibly the content of a report, or whether or not it's bound by a report. It 
seems to me that therefore not everyone is on board.  
 
Third, on Article 25, I do think that an interim solution is necessary and we've heard a lot about 
the mechanics of this type of model. However, we should not forget that Article 25 envisages 
arbitration, it's not adjudication. The DSU itself distinguishes between those forms of dispute 
settlement. So I ask the question, can we really assume that the judicial function will be exercised 
by these arbitrators in exactly the same manner as the Appellate Body currently does and that, for 
example, they will exercise in the same way certain inherent powers? As we just heard, everything 
would each time be based on the agreement of the two disputants. 
 
Turning now the question of whether RTA's are currently alternatives to appellate review. I think 
the answer is clearly no. For many of the disputes that are pending, there is simply no bilateral 
regional trade agreement in place between the disputants. If there is one, it does not provide for 
general jurisdiction of the dispute settlement system, so certain matters are clearly excluded from 
dispute settlement under RTAs. Also, if there is such an agreement, it doesn't provide for 
appellate review. Moreover, one could say that using today a bilateral regional trade agreement 
for litigating certain cases is in fact recognition of the acceptance of a one tier review model as 
being sufficient for resolving certain of these disputes. Currently, the RTA's, the bilateral 
agreements, they also lack a proper institutional context, even if that feature is gradually changing. 
The assumption is also that dispute settlement under an RTA does not result in the same 
reputational damage and the same collective pressure for compliance. Whilst there are many 
disputes between just two parties, such disputes have often a very important multilateral 
dimension. It is therefore important that these disputes can be brought to the WTO, where all 
other WTO Members can then participate as third parties, or at least, be part of the review as 
Members of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Putting those observations aside, I do think it's useful to look at bilateral agreements and regional 
agreements. First of all, for some of the long term reform solutions being discussed, relating to, 
for example, the processes for appointment and the question of municipal law as a question of 
fact, useful models are available in certain RTAs. Many bilateral regional agreements build on 
different parts of the DSU and attempt to improve the DSU rules. So, in RTAs, we find concrete 
treaty language addressing some of the problems being discussed in the WTO. 
 
Next, it is not sufficient to consider only bilateral and regional trade agreements as they exist 
today. We also need to take into account more long-term developments visible in international 
economic law but outside the context of the WTO. What we see is that in international economic 
law, there are proposals for creating a new type of court system taking the WTO model, 
improving the DSU and copying it in possibly a new plurilateral agreement to which States have 
the option of becoming a party. What's important is that the proposals do not envisage a body 
such as the DSB, meaning that such an agreement might create an agreement with strong 
compulsory jurisdiction and appellate review but without the fragility, I would say, that we see in 
the WTO. So if those negotiations move forward, the establishment of potentially a very strong 
judicial institution with competence in the area of international economic law. I appreciate that 
our panel was supposed to look at alternatives for what will happen at the end of the year but I 
do think that we sometimes need to look outside of the context of the WTO.  
 
Thank you. 
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(…) (contribution removed) 
 
 
Ricardo Ramirez 
 
Ok, let me be quick. On alternative dispute resolution medication conciliation, I think this is an 
Organization that is very proud to try to solve disputes through not adjudicative means.  Before 
this crisis, the numbers show that disputes were solved through consultations. I think that the 
problem is that once the crisis started, then there was an incentive by Members to go through 
litigation. I think the problem with the current crisis is that it also affects mediation and 
conciliation because there won't be any incentive for Members to seek other forms of dispute 
settlement. So, it's kind of pervasive, but that's the way I see it. Moreover, I don't think Japan and 
Korea could have solved their differences through conciliation or mediation nor the Airbus or 
Boeing cases could have been solved through conciliation or mediation.  
 
I wanted to make two points. I think that the dispute settlement system has been kidnapped and 
I think we are now living the Stockholm syndrome, where we are thinking now about our 
kidnapper and we are trying to please our kidnapper. I do believe that this no appeal ex ante is not 
an option because a seven Members fully functioning Appellate Body was clearly part of the 
bargain. Even if Members come up with a solution to zeroing or public body interpretation 
(assuming something is wrong with such interpretation), the problem would not be solved. The 
signals come from RTA's, if you look at the US proposal when they started the negotiations of 
the new NAFTA (or USMCA), I think it is quite telling. The US didn't want Chapter 19 [dispute 
settlement related to trade remedies disputes], for a general dispute mechanism the US wanted a 
set aside system where the losing party could choose whether you accept or not a decision and 
finally the US wanted nothing on investor-state dispute settlement.  That is a clear signal, that is 
the ransom. And that is the ransom that the kidnappers could be asking now in the WTO.  My 
point is you have to keep the negotiating leverage. At the end if the Membership agrees on one 
instance, it's fine, but it has to be result of a negotiation. You can’t give it from the start, it would 
be pleasing the kidnapper without knowing exactly what the ransom is. I will leave it there.  
 
 
(…) (contribution removed) 
 
xxxx 
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Conclusions and Closing 
 
Thomas Cottier 
 
Good afternoon. Peter van den Bossche said that three hours is a very long time and another 20 
minutes is perhaps too much for closing remarks. But I am intrigued trying to wrap up this truly 
interesting day. We started off with the question whether there is a problem at all with WTO 
dispute settlement. Some people found that there is no particular problem at hand. My own take 
away is that there is a problem on two levels. The first one is very specific. This is essentially the 
US concern with ADA Article 17.6 and the doctrine of permissible interpretation. That’s in my 
view where the clinical surgery should take place in remedying a particular issue, but the problem 
is more broadly framed, and that was mentioned today. The fact is that 70% of all cases are 
appealed. Can you indicate to me any domestic system where 70% of lower courts’ decisions are 
being appealed, and go all the way up to the highest court? Clearly, the situation in the WTO is 
not sustainable in the long run.  I think the whole debate on 90 days for AB review is just a 
symbol for that situation. This is a systemic issue which has nothing to do with the complaints of 
the particular parties. It needs to be addressed.  
 
Can you identify incentives not to appeal? There is no financial incentive not to appeal, there is 
no time incentive not to appeal, there is absolutely no risk to appeal, since you can always 
withdraw if things go wrong. So how do we handle this?  That’s where it comes to the issue of 
what today was called judicial engagement. I think both on the particular issue with the 
antidumping and the broader issue with these excessive appeals, it is mainly a question of margins 
of appreciation. What is the proper margin of appreciation panels should have in assessing facts 
and the law? This is a question not only in the context of the ADA in relation to national 
authorities in anti-dumping determination and countervailing duty. It is also an issue which 
comes up between the AB and Panels. What is the appropriate margin of appreciation? How do 
we calibrate the relationship between Panels and the Appellate Body within the system? That 
goes to the fundamental question, and we had a very interesting discussion on it. “What is the 
role of the Appellate Body within the system?” We still tend to discuss the Appellate Body in 
splendid isolation. We look at it as an institution on its own. We sometimes forget that it is a part 
of a system which starts off with political discussions and includes the Panel level and the 
Secretariat, which is never mentioned, but the grey eminence in the room. It includes the 
Appellate Body and it includes also the DSB. We need to calibrate the role of the Appellate Body 
in these terms. And we need to achieve greater clarity as to who is at the center of the system. Is 
it the Appellate Body or the many panels who are doing the ground work in the system? You can 
go both ways, but I think it has an impact on how we calibrate the relationship of Panels and the 
Appellate Body. It is a relationship of hierarchy where the teacher tells the school boy what to do, 
or is it a system of vertical checks and balances? These are the questions we need to take home.  
 
On interpretation: Again that depends on how you see the system. If you develop a hierarchical 
view then of course you may tend to say there is an inherent system of precedent and even stare 
decisis, while if you just apply the rules of public international law, it’s a civil law system of 
precedent where you have to take into account the case law but may also deviate from it for good 
reason. Again, it depends on how you see that relationship. That is also true for the second item 
we discussed in the second panel, i.e. the problem of legislative response. 
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It is here that we see why the dispute settlement system has been so successful. It no longer 
operates on consensus.  The losing party cannot object. If people tell us that you cannot deviate 
from consensus in the WTO, I tend to say we have already done so in the dispute settlement 
system which has been the more successful part in the system than the other branch. Yet as long 
as we have the current relationship between the dispute settlement system and the legislative 
negotiating branch, it will remain messy. We had a number of interesting approaches to how this 
could be addressed in the debate today, but the fundamental question remains whether we should 
aim towards   separation of powers. It is inherent to the rule of law that the courts are essentially 
independent, however you call them, from the executive branch again, these are issues one 
should clarify in order to know which directions we would like to take. I think the consensus 
question also leads me to panel number 3. It is because of consensus that we have this problem 
that the Appellate Body cannot be repleted here.  
 
My question to you is how would Members deal with the situation if the position of the DG 
cannot be filled. Would you just wait and see? How would you deal with the matter if some other 
power would block the process, for example a small country seeking to extract some 
concessions? I am confident that we would not be sitting in this room. I can understand the 
psychology of the current situation, but I would continue to propose to send the matter of 
appointing AB members back to the council and vote on it because it’s a personnel issue, it’s not 
a substantive issue. If this organization is not able to move forward on personnel issues, it may be 
hijacked by anybody anytime and randomly paralyzed. Voting is the prime option one should 
pursue, and I was very glad to see that the option of a plurilateral appeal’s arbitration on the basis 
of Article 25 DSU could actually work as a leverage to bring about the kind of decision on 
appointing appellate body members in time. I find it important, after today’s discussions, to think 
harder about the abusive right doctrine. It is recognized in public international law. It is 
recognized in WTO law, but we haven’t really fleshed it out in procedural terms.  
 
So that’s just a few remarks, but I would really like to conclude by thanking Peter, who is, I think, 
in these days a great example for  ‘optimism’ and for ‘moving on’. It is wonderful that he 
organized this conference and we had the opportunity to exchange views and to create mutual 
encouragement and support for further work on the multilateral system. Thank you very much.   
 
Peter Van den Bossche 
 
With this being said, the only thing that I will still do is to close this workshop. You have not 
heard much from me today but for my introduction. And that is because I, in the first place 
wanted to hear from you, and I will have the opportunity to say much more next Tuesday when I 
will give my farewell speech to the DSB. So, thank you very much for your participation. I 
thought it was a very interesting workshop and I was glad to have heard that also from others. 
There is, however, still is an awful lot of work to be done if WTO appellate review and the 
dispute settlement system is to be saved.  
 
xxxx 
